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INTRODUCTION 
This Article discusses the judicial status of religious 
tribunals in the United States and Canada.  The constitutions 
of both countries provide for freedom of religion.  The First 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
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thereof . . . .”1  North of the border, the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, part of the Canadian Constitution, 
establishes the “fundamental freedom” of “conscience and 
religion,” and states that no one may be discriminated 
against on account of religion.2  The American and Canadian 
constitutions differ in their treatment of the divine: the  
U.S. Constitution is free of any reference to God,3 whereas the 
Canadian Charter notes in its Preamble that “Canada is 
founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God 
and the rule of law.”4  Nevertheless, both countries have 
secular judicial systems: divine involvement in the judicial 
process appears to be limited to judges’ oaths.5 
God and law do, however, intersect in both countries—in 
the form of religious arbitration.  Religious arbitration, for 
the purposes of this Article, is defined as a voluntary  
dispute resolution process, conducted according to religious 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, §§ 2, 15 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter Charter]. 
 3. Article VI explicitly prevents the United States from employing a 
religious test for office.  U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be 
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States.”).  The only direct reference to God in the U.S. Constitution is found at 
the very end, in the Attestation Clause: “Done in Convention by the Unanimous 
Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of 
our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth.”  For a discussion of 
the “Sunday exception” in Article II, see Jaynie Randall, Sundays Excepted, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 507 (2008) (arguing that the “Sunday exception” did not reflect a 
view of the United States as a Christian nation, but rather that it was designed 
to accommodate different state approaches to Sabbath observance). 
 4. Charter, supra note 2, at pmbl. 
 5. For the federal judicial oath in the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 453 
(2006).  The oath that must be sworn is: “I, __, do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to 
the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and 
perform all the duties incumbent upon me as __ under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.  So help me God.”  Id.  The invocation “so help me 
God” is a standard formula, also found in the oaths taken by federal legislators 
and officers.  See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006).  The U.S. Supreme Court famously 
opens its sessions with the invocation “God Save the United States and this 
Honorable Court.”  See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting).  “So help me God” is found also in Canadian judicial oaths.  See, 
e.g., Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, § 10 (Can.) (stipulating oath of 
office for supreme court justices in Canada). 
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principles.6  Such arbitration often serves as a substitute for 
proceedings in civil court.7  At present, in the United States, 
agreements to arbitrate a dispute before a religious tribunal 
are generally enforceable in civil courts, as are awards  
made by religious arbitral tribunals.8  In Canada, religious 
arbitration agreements and awards are also usually 
enforceable in courts, with the exception of family disputes in 
the provinces of Ontario and Québec.9 
This Article questions this approach.  It argues that 
holding religious arbitration agreements and awards binding 
in cases where civil courts are able to handle the dispute 
poses problems for religious freedom.  Constitutional law in 
the United States and Canada points towards holding such 
agreements and awards unenforceable.  At the same time, 
this Article recognizes that certain types of agreements can 
only be settled by religious tribunals; in these cases, religious 
arbitration promotes, rather than hinders, religious freedom. 
Part I of this Article traces religious dispute resolution to 
its origins in England and France, before looking at how it 
was received in colonial America, the early United States, 
and Canada.  Part II looks at the current status of religious 
arbitration in the United States and Canada, and discusses 
questions about its enforceability.  Part III examines 
arguments that have traditionally been made against 
religious arbitration, and demonstrates why these arguments 
do not prove that enforceable religious arbitral agreements 
and awards are troublesome from a constitutional 
perspective.  Part III then considers the question raised by 
this Article against the judicial enforcement of religious 
arbitration awards and agreements: that it violates parties’ 
right to freedom of religion.  It argues that the enforcement of 
 6. Arbitration has many possible definitions.  It can refer to processes that 
are binding, or non-binding; to actions that are highly formal, or highly 
informal; and to processes that are intended to serve as a prelude to court 
action, a partial substitute for court action, or a complete substitute.  NAT’L 
INST. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY 
ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION app. 2 (1983).  For example, “court-annexed” 
arbitration is a form of arbitration widely used in administrative law, whereby 
civil suits are first referred to arbitrators who render non-binding decisions; 
these decisions can be reviewed by the courts later, if required.  Id. at 36. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
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agreements and awards stemming from entirely secular 
disputes is constitutionally problematic.  Part IV considers 
responses that may be made to the arguments in Part III. 
I. HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION 
A. Religious Modes of Dispute Resolution in England and 
France 
God and law were intertwined in medieval Europe.  The 
English legal textbook known as Bracton, written about 1230, 
stated that there could be no king “where will rules, rather 
than law,” and that the king was the “vicar of God” and 
therefore answerable to Him.10  Bracton summed up the 
whole thus: “The king should not be beneath man but 
beneath God and the law.”11  Divine and secular law were  
not always easily distinguishable.  In 1489, the English 
Chancellor, ruling in a trust dispute, held that “each Law is, 
or ought to be, in accordance with the Law of God.”12  For 
much of English history, church and state were mixed, and 
law was infused with religious principles. 
A similar situation existed in France.  Although France 
had known no English-style Reformation, it moved toward 
greater state control of religion in the seventeenth century: 
the Déclaration du Clergé de France (1682) established 
Gallicanism in France and the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes followed three years later, expelling Protestants.13  
Through the king, religion and law were inextricably linked: 
une foi, une loi, un roi.14 
Even though law and religion were interconnected, it is 
possible to trace the origins of religious arbitration back to 
pre-modern England and France.  The English and French 
religious authorities frequently provided routes to justice that 
were an alternative to the state courts.  Unlike modern 
arbitration, the religious courts exercised compulsory 
jurisdiction; however, they are like modern religious arbitral 
 10. HENRICUS DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, Bk 
1:8 (photo. reprint 2009) (London, Flesher & Young, 1640). 
 11. Id. 
 12. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 313–14 (2009). 
 13. PHILIPPE SUEUR, 2 HISTOIRE DU DROIT PUBLIC FRANÇAIS 477–78 (1989). 
 14. Id. at 476 (“One faith, one law, one king.”). 
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tribunals to some extent, in that they competed directly with 
civil courts. 
1. England 
Church law can be seen as an early forerunner of 
religious arbitration in England.  By the fourteenth century, 
the church courts had adopted the practice of hearing appeals 
from the common-law courts, and the monarch was obliged  
to enact a statute to prevent it.15  Up to the eve of the 
Reformation, the church still exercised jurisdiction over what 
we would today regard as quintessentially secular contract 
law.16  Although this business disappeared, the church courts 
retained active dockets: the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century church courts heard matrimonial, probate, tithe,  
and defamation cases.17  Whereas the first category was 
comparatively rare,18 the second category grew increasingly 
important as a greater and greater proportion of the 
population made wills.19  Between the mid-sixteenth and mid-
seventeenth centuries, slander cases exploded in the church 
courts,20 and the population as a whole had to pay tithes, 
which were a constant source of litigation.21  Although the 
 15. First Statute of Praemunire, 27 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 1 (1353).  The statute 
noted that “the judgments rendered in the [king’s] court are being impeached in 
the court of another, to the prejudice and disherison of our lord the king.”  
LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 331.  It provided that anyone who sought to annul 
a common law verdict by travelling to Rome would have to appear before the 
king’s council to justify his actions.  See id. at 331–32.  It was strengthened by 
the Second (Great) Statute of Praemunire of 1393, which stated that the 
ecclesiastics had to enforce the judgments of the king’s courts, and also provided 
that anyone who purchased a legal instrument from Rome that was “inimical to 
the [king], his crown, his regality, or his aforesaid kingdom” was to be outlawed. 
16 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1393).  See W.T. Waugh, The Great Statute of Praemunire, 37 
ENG. HIST. REV. 173 (1922). 
 16. R.B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL 
COURTS 1500-1860, at 15 (2006).  The church exercised its jurisdiction through 
the doctrine of fidei laesio, or breach of faith.  Id. at 15–16.  A litigant could 
claim ecclesiastical jurisdiction over a contract dispute by alleging not that his 
counterparty had failed to perform, but that he had breached his oath to 
perform.  Id.  These suits disappeared in the sixteenth century as the common 
law courts found ways of exercising jurisdiction over these disputes.  Id. at 19–
20; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 131–32. 
 17. OUTHWAITE, supra note 16, at 20. 
 18. Id. at 51. 
 19. Id. at 33–39. 
 20. Id. at 41. 
 21. Id. at 23–24. 
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church courts were dealt a heavy blow to their jurisdiction in 
the English Revolution,22 they survived with jurisdiction over 
matrimonial and probate disputes until 1857, when they 
finally surrendered control over all that is now considered 
“secular.”23 
Not all of this can be considered “arbitration” in the sense 
defined earlier.  In the case of probate disputes before 1857, 
for example, only the church courts had jurisdiction over 
grants of probate.24  However, in various instances—for 
example, contract disputes—the church courts were in direct 
competition with the royal courts.25 
2. France 
France became a centralized nation-state later than 
England,26 but nevertheless demonstrates the same pattern 
by which church courts competed with royal courts, and 
gradually lost influence to them.  By the thirteenth century, 
jurisdiction in France was shared between a wide variety of 
courts—royal, seigneurial, ecclesiastical, municipal.27  
Medieval ecclesiastical justice was administered via 
officialités, organized by the bishop of each diocese.28  These 
officialités heard cases where they could exercise either 
personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction.29  
Personal jurisdiction could be established if a party was 
either a regular or secular clerk.30  The church’s jurisdiction 
extended to both civil and criminal cases: in the latter cases, 
 22. Id. at 78. 
 23. LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 355. 
 24. 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 605–06, 686–89 
(3d reprt. 1977). 
 25. Id. at 131 (“The willingness of the church courts to take jurisdiction in 
cases involving oaths led to a quasi-arbitral jurisdiction in contract matters.”). 
 26. The French royal writ in the eleventh and twelfth centuries hardly ran 
beyond the central domain of Ile-de-France.  See ALBERT RIGAUDIERE, HISTOIRE 
DU DROIT ET DES INSTITUTIONS DANS LA FRANCE MEDIEVALE ET MODERNE 245 
(4th ed. 2010).  From the end of the twelfth century to the end of the fifteenth 
century, royal power reasserted itself.  Id. at 309.  By contrast, England became 
a centralized nation-state much earlier.  See generally R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, 
THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 85–110 (2d ed. 1988) (comparing 
early rise of English legal system with later development in France and on the 
European continent). 
 27. RIGAUDIERE, supra note 26, at 350. 
 28. Id. at 356. 
 29. Id. at 357–58. 
 30. Id. at 357. 
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the church could inflict any punishment known to the civil 
courts, with the exception of death.31  The church claimed 
subject matter jurisdiction over matters of faith, such as 
heresy and blasphemy; it also dealt with family law and 
marriage, and claimed a wide jurisdiction over disputes that 
had a “mixed” religious and secular character, such as 
contracts made under oath.32  Any “grave transgression” 
against public morality could be tried in church court.33 
The church courts reached the zenith of their power in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.34  The royal courts 
sought to squeeze out this ecclesiastical competition.  From 
the fourteenth century onwards, royal courts established 
jurisdiction over cases involving church officials that involved 
serious crimes against the public order.35  They also 
established appellate jurisdiction over the church courts in 
cases where the church courts overstepped the bounds of 
their jurisdiction; in the fifteenth century, this became  
a general appellate jurisdiction.36  In 1539, ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction was dramatically curtailed by François I with the 
Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts, which provided that 
ecclesiastical judges could not hear “actions pures 
personelles,” and left them with competence only over “purely 
religious matters.”37  In 1695, such ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
was placed under royal supervision by Louis XIV.38 
 
 31. Id. at 358.  “It was a principle of the Canon law that the Church could 
not shed blood . . . .”  A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRANCE 50 (photo. reprint 2000) 
(John Simpson trans., 4th ed. 1913).  However, being tried in a Church court 
would not necessarily save a wrongdoer’s life: if it was felt that the death 
penalty was merited, the Church would hand over the guilty individual to the 
secular authorities for execution.  Id. 
 32. RIGAUDIERE, supra note 26, at 359. 
 33. Id. 
 34. BRIGITTE BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET & JEAN GAUDEMET, INTRODUCTION 
HISTORIQUE AU DROIT XIIIE-XXE SIECLES 175 (2000). 
 35. RIGAUDIERE, supra note 26, at 360. 
 36. Id. at 361. 
 37. See Ordonnance d’Août 1539 Prise par le Roi François I,  
ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/villers-
cotterets.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); see also BASDEVANT-GAUDEMET, supra 
note 34, at 176 (noting that François I had “reduced in six lines [of statute] 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the very limit of reason” (author trans., quotation 
marks and citation omitted)). 
 38. BASDEVANT–GAUDEMET, supra note 34, at 176. 
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As in England, there were not always civil alternatives to 
church dispute resolution.  However, the church directly 
competed with secular courts in some areas.39  This 
competition between state- and church-sponsored dispute 
resolution was found also among the English and French 
settlers in North America, which is the subject of the next 
section. 
B. Religious Arbitration in North America 
The relationship between church and state was very 
different in colonial and post-colonial North America from the 
relationship seen in England and France.  In colonial 
America, various colonies had established churches.40  In 
1789 the First Congress of the United States proposed to the 
states the First Amendment, which prevented an established 
church from reaching the same position in national American 
life as it had in Britain.41  State established churches 
continued in existence until 1833, at which point 
Massachusetts repealed its church taxes and there was no 
longer any established church in the country.42 
North of the border in Canada, a different state of affairs 
prevailed.  If British emigration to the New World was driven 
by religious dissenters, French emigration was decidedly 
conformist: in 1629, an edict was passed stating that only 
Roman Catholics could settle in “New France.”43  In the mid-
eighteenth century, the bishop of Québec “was in effect an 
officer of the [French] crown.”44  The British colonies in 
Canada also created bonds between church and state.  Nova 
Scotia, conquered by Britain in 1710, established the Church 
of England in 1758.45  The Quebec Act of 1774 granted 
tolerance to Catholics in the province, but Anglicanism was 
 39. RIGAUDIERE, supra note 26, at 359 (“All areas of law [other than 
religious law, marriage law, and law concerning church property] were subject 
to a concurrent jurisdiction. It often gave rise to a lively competition and offered 
a true choice to the litigant.” (author trans.)). 
 40. See RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC: FAITH IN THE FOUNDING OF 
AMERICA 189–90 (James H. Hutson ed., 2000). 
 41. 1 Stat. 97 (1789). 
 42. RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC, supra note 40, at 196. 
 43. Id. at 75. 
 44. ROBERT CHOQUETTE, CANADA’S RELIGIONS: AN HISTORICAL 
INTRODUCTION 141 (2004). 
 45. Id. at 163. 
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established as the province’s religion shortly afterwards.46  By 
1800 all of Canada’s provinces or territories favored the 
Church of England, either officially or unofficially.47  The 
Church was however swiftly disestablished: by the early 
nineteenth century in the maritime provinces, and by 1854, in 
the rest of the country.48 
Despite this fluctuating relationship between church and 
state, religious arbitration flourished in colonial and early 
independent North America.  The next sections describe some 
of the religious arbitration processes employed by the 
European settlers.  The descriptions are indicative, and do 
not present a comprehensive account of religious arbitration 
in North America in this period: as one scholar has written, 
“[t]he shadowy and unsystematic documentary record of 
[these] processes poses particular challenges for those 
wishing to study them.”49  However, they demonstrate that 
religious arbitration in North America is not simply a modern 
phenomenon. 
1. Religious Arbitration in Colonial British America 
The functioning of religious arbitration in colonial 
America can be seen particularly clearly in Massachusetts.  
Church was at the center of life for the Puritans, and their 
church courts had powers that outstripped their English 
counterparts. Civil and religious justice were thoroughly 
mixed.  Even criminal cases could end up in a church court,50 
whereas the civil courts exercised jurisdiction over offenses 
that were purely religious—such as failure to attend church.51 
Churches often functioned as the only available courts.52     
However, we see from an early time what can be described as 
“arbitration.”  The Massachusetts colony encouraged the 
settlement of disputes outside of the “legal” framework.  A 
Boston town in 1635 laid down an ordinance that no 
 46. Id. at 165. 
 47. Id. at 205. 
 48. Id. at 222. 
 49. Philip Girard, Taking Litigation Seriously: The Market Wharf 
Controversy at Halifax, 1785–1820, in 8 ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN 
LAW: IN HONOUR OF R.C.B. RISK 213, 235 n.3 (G. Blaine Baker & Jim Phillips 
eds., 1981). 
 50. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 22 (1983). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 23. 
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congregation members could litigate unless there had been a 
prior effort at arbitration.53  A case from 1640 describes 
arbitration between a prominent lady and a carpenter.54  The 
church sponsored arbitration—twice—which the lady refused 
to abide by.55  The dispute then went into a church, which 
enforced it: not by seizing her property, which it could not 
do,56 but by excommunicating her.57 
Church courts in Massachusetts could only exercise 
jurisdiction in disputes where the parties were of the same 
congregation.58  However, these courts could have certain 
advantages.  Churches met all year round; the civil courts of 
first instance, on the other hand, sat only four times a year, 
and in the county seat.59  Furthermore, the church was less 
formal, and there was no need to go to the expense of hiring a 
lawyer.60  Religious arbitration was also divinely sanctioned: 
St. Paul exhorted the believers to settle disputes among 
themselves, urging them not to take cases to the courts of the 
“unbelievers.”61  The civil courts functioned as a “back-up” 
when the civil power was needed—for example, to arrest 
persons and attach property.62  The parallel jurisdiction of the 
civil and church courts is a feature of modern-day arbitration, 
and it is not surprising that the other characteristics that we 
often associate with modern arbitration—speed, informality 
and inexpensiveness—were present in religious arbitration 
before American independence. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 23–24. 
 55. Id. at 23. 
 56. Even in the theocracy that was seventeenth-century Massachusetts, 
there was a divide between civil judicial power and the church.  The 
Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 stated that “[c]ivill Authoritie hath 
power and libertie to deale with any Church member in a way of Civill Justice, 
notwithstanding any Church relation, office, or interest,” and churches could 
not interfere with civil offices.  However, any church had the “libertie to deale 
with any of their members in a church way that are in the hand of Justice.”  See 
WILLIAM H. WHITMORE, A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE LAWS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS COLONY FROM 1630 TO 1686, at 47–57 (photo. reprint 2006) 
(Boston 1890). 
 57. AUERBACH, supra note 50, at 23–24. 
 58. WILLIAM E. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH 
COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1725–1825, at 43 (1981). 
 59. Id. at 44. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 1 Corinthians 6:6. 
 62. NELSON, supra note 58, at 44. 
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2. Religious Arbitration in the Early United States 
The success of colonial-era religious arbitration did not 
survive into the post-Revolutionary era.  By the early years of 
the nineteenth century, the courts had effectively become “the 
only institution that was available to adjudicate a dispute.”63  
The ultimate sanction of the church courts was 
excommunication, which increasingly lost its bite.  It was no 
longer nearly as common in the nineteenth century for every 
member of a community to attend the same Congregationalist 
church.64  Isolated instances remained: for example, a church 
in Middleboro, Massachusetts in 1826 handled a dispute 
between two members concerning a dam.65  But religious 
arbitration could not compete with the secular system 
without adopting a secular enforcement mechanism. 
Outside of New England, religious arbitration survived 
among various groups during the nineteenth century.  The 
Utopian Christian communities sought to internalize their 
disputes and avoid the courts. John Humphrey Noyes wrote 
that the Oneida community in New York, a society of 
Christian Perfectionists, was “very averse to litigation and 
intended . . . to preclude the possibility of it.”66  A Christian 
Utopian community made up of German immigrants in 
Aurora, Oregon, allegedly went nineteen years without 
recourse to the courts.67 
The most successful Utopian community by far was the 
Mormons in Utah territory.68  The Mormons shunned 
“gentile” justice and lawyers.69  Brigham Young summed up 
their views in 1857: “There is not a righteous person, in this 
community, who will have difficulties that cannot be settled 
by arbitrators . . . .”70  He argued that civil courts wasted time 
and “destroyed the best interests of the community,” 
colorfully adding that courts were a “kitchen of the devil, 
 63. Id. at 76. 
 64. Id. at 147. 
 65. NELSON, supra note 58, at 198 n.62. 
 66. AUERBACH, supra note 50, at 51. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 54. 
 69. C. Paul Dredge, Dispute Settlement in the Mormon Community: The 
Operation of Ecclesiastical Courts in Utah, in 4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 191, 198 (Klaus-Friedrich Koch ed., 1979). 
 70. Id. 
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prepared for hell” and that lawyers were a “stink in the 
nostrils” of every Latter-Day Saint.71  However, despite the 
Mormon migration to an area of the West that was largely 
unpopulated—and so where they might be able to form a 
community in peace72—they still had to compete with civil 
justice.73  Utah was incorporated as a territory in 1850, four 
years after the Latter-Day Saints traveled to the region, and 
with territorial status came federal judges.74 
The Mormons had never sought complete judicial 
autonomy: following a revelation, Joseph Smith had 
established in 1831 that crimes such as murder and robbery 
were to be tried in civil courts by the “law of the land.”75  But 
even after federal judges began administering justice in the 
territory, the Mormon community generally preferred  
to deal with intra-community disputes themselves.76  What 
eventually weakened the strength of the Mormon 
ecclesiastical justice system was not the pressures of civil 
justice or the federal government; it was the growth of 
religious diversity.  Like all other religious arbitral tribunals, 
the Mormons could only claim jurisdiction by consent of the 
parties, and as the territory (and later state) became more 
religiously diverse, the power of the religious courts 
weakened.77 
All of the Christian communities mentioned above felt 
that they were obeying St. Paul’s commandment to  
settle disputes among themselves.78  But other religious 
communities too preferred to avoid the secular courts.  The 
Jewish population had historically retained dispute 
resolution within their communities: this tradition dates to 
the second century, when the Roman administration in 
 71. Id. at 199. 
 72. TODD M. KERSTETTER, GOD’S COUNTRY, UNCLE SAM’S LAND: FAITH AND 
CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 40 (2006).  The Saints intended to “abandon 
the United States to found Zion outside its borders.”  Id. 
 73. Dredge, supra note 69, at 198. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 194. 
 76. Id. at 198.  This was often easy: lower courts in the Territory were 
controlled by Mormons, who would allow litigants to choose what mode of 
adjudication they wanted.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 214. 
 78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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Palestine abolished official Jewish courts.79  In Europe, 
Jewish communities had adopted Batei Din to avoid their 
disabilities in civic life, which sometimes prevented them 
even from testifying in court;80 yet in any case, there was a 
general prohibition against settling disputes in gentile 
courts.81  Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the 
New York Jewish community adopted a mode of arbitration 
under the auspices of the Kehillah, a newly-created 
community organization.82  Kehillah tribunals settled both 
commercial and non-commercial disputes.83  Although they 
faded after World War I, other arbitral tribunals arose to take 
their place.  The Jewish Arbitration Court was created in 
1929; within a year, it had a rival, the Jewish Conciliation 
Court of America.84  In New York, Jewish tribunals were 
given a lease of life by the passage of the Municipal Court Act 
of 1915, which made their judgments legally binding.85  
Similar measures were adopted elsewhere: for example, 
Maryland courts enforced judgments from tribunals where 
both parties had agreed to be bound, which made it possible 
for a Jewish tribunal to begin operating there in 1912.86 
3. Religious Arbitration in Colonial Canada 
Religion permeated colonial Canadian society just as it 
did in America. As noted above, it was established in 1629 
that only Catholics could emigrate to New France.87  
Protestants were banished in the 1640s,88 and colonial 
legislation was heavily influenced by the state Catholicism.89  
Québécois courts were modeled on the French system, and 
the Church courts exercised a jurisdiction in Québec similar 
 79. AUERBACH, supra note 50, at 77. 
 80. Id. 
 81. This prohibition remains, according to some scholars. 1 EMANUEL 
QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL LAW 174 (1990). 
 82. AUERBACH, supra note 50, at 79. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 83–84. 
 85. Id. at 160 n.20. 
 86. B.H. Hartogensis, A Successful Community Court, 12 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 
183, 183 (1929). 
 87. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 88. MARC DURAND, HISTOIRE DU QUEBEC 17 (1999). 
 89. JOHN DICKINSON & BRIAN YOUNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF QUEBEC 37 (4th 
ed. 2008) (observing that Québec was regulated by the Custom of Paris, which 
was “influenced by a religious and state ideology”). 
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to that which they retained in France.90  As a result, there 
was little overlap between the church and state system.  
However, religious diversity increased as Protestant 
denominations made themselves at home in other parts of 
British North America and, following the Treaty of Paris of 
1763, in New France itself.  These communities sought to 
resolve disputes among themselves, particularly in frontier 
territories where lawyers were too expensive or courts too 
distant.91 
Anglophone Baptists in Nova Scotia in the nineteenth 
century held that “Bretheren in christ [sic] . . . ought not to go 
to law with one another; but all their Differences ought to be 
Decided by the Brethren.”92  Quakers were opposed to 
testifying on oath, and thus were generally prevented from 
suing in state courts; they set up alternative processes of 
mediation for their disputes.93  The Mennonites, for their 
part, had emerged in Europe as the “most separated 
brethren” of the Protestant Reformation and sought to retain 
their way of life and culture in Canada.94  They were 
frequently in conflict with secular laws,95 and Mennonite 
churches would exercise a disciplinary function among their 
members (and even non-members).96 
Following the British conquest, Catholics also preferred 
to resolve disputes among themselves: Acadians in New 
Brunswick in the early nineteenth century, linguistically and 
geographically isolated, often chose to put their disputes to  
 90. CHARLES LINDSEY, ROME IN CANADA: THE ULTRAMONTANE STRUGGLE 
FOR SUPREMACY OVER THE CIVIL AUTHORITY 78 (Toronto, Lovells Bros. 1877) 
(noting that “the Gallican liberties were introduced into Canada by France,” 
although reserving the question of whether the “whole body of the droit 
gallican” was in force in New France). 
 91. See, e.g., D.G. Bell, Maritime Legal Institutions Under the Ancien 
Régime 1710–1850, 23 MANITOBA L.J. 103, 115–16 (1995) (noting that “much 
emphasis was placed on resolving quarrels privately,” because of the costs of the 
legal system); FRANK H. EPP, MENNONITES IN CANADA, 1786-1920, at 113 (1974) 
(“The importance of the clergyman and the church congregation as keepers of 
the peace . . . on the frontiers of Upper Canada [can be] inferred.”). 
 92. Bell, supra note 91, at 116. 
 93. Albert Schrauwers, The Politics of Schism: The Separation of the 
Children of Peace, 1812, in FAITH, FRIENDS AND FRAGMENTATION: ESSAYS ON 
NINETEENTH CENTURY QUAKERISM IN CANADA 69, 71–72 (Albert Schrauwers 
ed., 1995). 
 94. EPP, supra note 91, at 23, 54. 
 95. Id. at 114. 
 96. Id. at 127. 
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a local Catholic priest rather than deal with the  
secular courts.97  There was in fact no Acadian lawyer from  
New Brunswick until 1870.98  Unsurprisingly, early Jewish 
communities adopted their own dispute resolution 
procedures: the elders of the original Sephardic congregation 
in Montréal constituted a kind of Beth Din which could 
command any member of the community to appear before 
them, and impose penalties for any misdemeanor.99  This 
form of arbitration was no doubt made more appealing by the 
fact that Jews labored under civil disabilities until the 1830s, 
and were blocked from participating in public life by the need 
to swear on explicitly Christian oaths.100 
As the above discussion shows, religious arbitration in 
North America is nothing new.  The next Part discusses 
religious arbitration in modern-day United States and 
Canada. 
II. RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION TODAY IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND CANADA 
A.  United States 
This section discusses religious arbitration in the United 
States.  The first subsection examines the framework in 
which religious arbitration is conducted today.  The following 
subsections describe the operation of religious arbitration in 
the United States and the obstacles to binding religious 
arbitration. 
It should be observed from the outset that there are no 
remarkable differences between the states in their 
enforcement of religious arbitral awards.  This is because of 
the dominance of the Federal Arbitration Act and the 
Uniform Arbitration Act in this area.101  This situation may 
change, however: Oklahoma in 2010 amended its constitution 
to prevent judges from considering sharia law in their 
 97. See D.G. Bell, A Perspective on Legal Pluralism in 19th-Century New 
Brunswick, 37 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 86 (1988). 
 98. Id. at 89. 
 99. BENJAMIN G. SACK, HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN CANADA 52–53 (Ralph 
Novek trans., 1965). 
 100. GERALD TULCHINSKY, CANADA’S JEWS: A PEOPLE’S JOURNEY 27–29 
(2008). 
 101. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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decisions.102  This provision, which was made the subject of a 
preliminary injunction by a federal judge, would have the 
effect of making judgments by Islamic tribunals 
unenforceable.103  Other states are considering similar bans 
on use of religious law.104  For the purposes of arbitration, 
however, the states will be considered as a unitary whole. 
1. Framework of Religious Arbitration 
Arbitration in the United States today is governed 
largely by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Uniform 
Arbitration Act (UAA).  The FAA was enacted in 1925 and 
was the fruit of lobbying to make arbitration clauses in 
contracts enforceable.105 Arbitration is encouraged at the 
federal level. In 1983, the Court declared that there was a 
federal policy “favoring” the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements;106 this decision was followed the next year by 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, in which the Court reiterated the 
“national policy favoring arbitration”107 and held that the 
FAA, which was enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers,108 governed commercial contracts that were executed 
under state law.109  This ruling had the effect of preempting 
state laws restricting the enforceability of agreements to 
arbitrate in commercial disputes.110 
 102. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 103. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298; see also Michael A. Helfand, Oklahoma 
Panics over Islamic Law, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 2010, at A5, available at 
http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentary/107585918.html.  The Tenth 
Circuit recently heard oral arguments in an appeal against the preliminary 
injunction. Robyn Hagan Cain, Tenth Circuit to Hear Arguments in Anti-Sharia 
Law Case, FINDLAW: U.S. TENTH CIRCUIT (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:05 PM), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/tenth_circuit/2011/09/tenth-circuit-to-hear-arguments-
in-anti-sharia-law-case.html. 
 104. Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New 
Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 
1239 (2011); Donna Leinwand, States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, U.S.A. 
TODAY, Dec. 9, 2010, at 3A. 
 105. Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration 
Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 
NEB. L. REV. 397, 430 (1998). Up to this point, agreements to arbitrate were not 
enforceable at common law.  Id. at 431. 
 106. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
 107. 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 108. Id. at 11. 
 109. Id. at 16. 
 110. See Harding, supra note 105, at 468–69. 
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 The Uniform Arbitration Act, for its part, was 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1955.111  It has been adopted by thirty-
five jurisdictions, and another fourteen have substantially 
similar legislation.112  At the time of its promulgation, state 
law was often hostile to arbitration agreements.113  This has 
largely been changed, and under the UAA courts now 
generally enforce arbitral awards.114  Under the UAA, a court 
may overturn an award for procedural defects, such as bias or 
lack of notice to the parties.115  It may also vacate an award if 
the arbitrators have overstepped their powers and may 
“correct an award” where there has been an “evident 
mistake.”116 
Neither the FAA nor the UAA provide that courts may 
overturn awards that disregard constitutional rights—for 
example, the right to be free of sexual discrimination.  
However, courts may vacate awards given under federal or 
state law on the grounds that they violate “public policy” or 
show “manifest disregard for the law.”117  This enables courts 
to vacate awards that clash with certain federal or state 
constitutional rights. 
Agreements to arbitrate, as distinct from arbitration 
awards, can also only be overturned by courts in limited 
circumstances.  In Perry v. Thomas, the Court stated that 
“[a]n agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, as a matter of federal law, ‘save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’ ” 118  All arbitration agreements prima facie breach 
 111. Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, 
Revising and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 1 (2001). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (“The intent of the UAA to overcome courts’ adverse common-law 
attitudes has been accomplished.”). 
 115. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 26, 7 U.L.A. 77–78 (2000). 
 116. Id. at §§ 12–13. 
 117. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between 
Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the Waning 
Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597 (2009).  But see Hall 
St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that the 
“manifest disregard for the law” standard may be encapsulated within section 
10 of the FAA, which provides statutory grounds for overturning of arbitral 
awards). 
 118. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (citation omitted). 
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the right to a jury trial enshrined in the Seventh 
Amendment:119 as a result, courts have held that this right 
can be waived when a party “knowingly and intelligently” 
enters into an arbitration agreement.120  In Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court held that civil 
rights claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration.121  
Because of the federal policy in favor of arbitration, some 
state courts have adopted unconscionability doctrine as a way 
of rendering arbitration agreements unenforceable.122  
However, unconscionability is “generally a loser of an 
argument,” and arbitration agreements are typically 
enforced.123 
2. Description of Religious Arbitration 
Christian arbitration still exists in the United States, 
although it has attracted less media attention than religious 
tribunals of other religions.124  The largest Christian 
arbitration service in the United States is Peacemaker 
Ministries.125  Through its affiliate, the Institute for Christian 
Conciliation, it offers non-binding conciliation and mediation 
services, and—if those fail—legally binding arbitration 
 119. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing that “[i]n Suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved”). 
 120. Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a 
Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 24–25 (2003). 
 121. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
 122. See Aaron-Andew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic 
Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 
(2008). 
 123. Id. at 1442.  For a recent defeat of an unconscionability argument in the 
Supreme Court, see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 124. This may be because there has been an assumption that Christian 
principles have influenced the secular legal system, and so explicitly “Christian” 
arbitration need not be radically different from civil justice.  In 1892, for 
example, Justice Brewer averred that the United States “is a Christian nation.”  
Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).  
Justice Brewer was a committed Christian.  See EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., 
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, 
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
46 (2000).  He affirmed his views, qualifying them only slightly, in his later 
tract, The United States: A Christian Nation (1905).  See Daniel L. Dreisbach, 
The United States: A Christian Nation, 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 607 (1997) (book 
review). 
 125. R. Seth Shippee, Peacemaking: Applying Faith to Conflict Resolution, 10 
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 4 (2004). 
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services.126  Any one of these may involve the use of Biblical 
scripture as a guide to decision-making;127 the professed aim 
of the religious procedure is to “glorify God by helping people 
to resolve disputes,” and its rules of arbitration are 
interpreted in accordance with this mission.128  Peacemaker 
Ministries conducts about 100 “conciliations” each year, 
which include mediations, arbitrations, and church 
interventions.129  It also certifies about 150 conciliators 
around the country, who each perform conciliations.130  Some 
of these dispute resolutions might otherwise end up in the 
secular court system. 
Islamic dispute resolution services are also available,  
and may take the form of either mediation or arbitration.131 
Although mediation is more informal, courts may be more 
likely to enforce an agreement arrived at through mediation, 
since arbitrated agreements are sometimes seen as 
incompatible with local laws;132 it has been reported that even 
mediated awards often fail of enforcement.133  As indicated 
above, the Batei Din continue their role in society.  One such 
organization, Beth Din of America, was founded in 1960 and 
offers resolution of both commercial and family disputes.134  
Like the Institute for Christian Conciliation, it gives those 
using its services the option of binding arbitration.135  The 
 126. Rules of Procedure, INST. OF CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, http://www.peace 
maker.net/site/c.nuIWL7MOJtE/b.5378801/k.D71A/Rules_of_Procedure.htm 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
 127. For example, the rules of procedure state that “arbitrators may request 
or consider briefs or position papers that set forth the parties’ understandings of 
the legal, factual, or scriptural issues.”  Id. § 38. 
 128. Id. § 1. 
 129. E-mail from Peacemaker Ministries to author (Oct. 26, 2011) (on file 
with author).  In addition, Peacemaker Ministries conducts about 1,000 
“coaching” calls each year, in which it attempts to help people find ways to 
settle disputes on their own. 
 130. Id.  The conciliators might carry out up to ten conciliations per year 
each. 
 131. See Shippee, supra note 125, at 4–5. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Abdul Wahid Sheikh Osman, Islamic Arbitration Courts in America &  
Canada? (2005), http://www.hiiraan.com/op/eng/2005/dec/Prof_Abdulwahid211 
205.htm. 
 134. See Organizations and Affliations, BETH DIN OF AMERICA, 
http://www.bethdin.org/organization-affiliations.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
 135. The arbitration agreement for parties using Beth Din of America’s 
services provides that “[t]he parties agree that the judgment may be entered on 
the award in any court of competent jurisdiction in the State of New Jersey and 
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Beth Din of America conducts about 400 “family” matters 
each year—probate matters, divorces, and status 
determinations—and 100 commercial matters.136  Not all of 
these commercial matters go to arbitration; however, some of 
them would be heard in secular court, if not for the 
availability of the Beth Din as an alternative forum. 
There is no need here to reference all of the various 
religious arbitration services available in the United States; 
rather, it is enough to acknowledge their existence.  Their 
success, in large part, has been down to the willingness of 
secular courts to enforce awards that they hand down. The 
enforceability of these awards is dealt with in the next 
subsection. 
3. Enforceability of Awards of Religious Tribunals 
Various courts have considered the enforceability of 
religious arbitration proceedings.  In general, courts have 
ruled that they are enforceable in civil courts.  In Prescott v. 
Northlake Christian School, the Fifth Circuit upheld a 
Christian arbitration clause between an elementary school 
and a teacher alleging discrimination and breach of 
contract.137  The arbitrator granted damages to the teacher on 
the grounds that the school had breached its contractual 
commitment to “resolve all differences, including those not 
submitted to arbitration, according to biblical principles.”138  
The Fifth Circuit upheld the award even though damages on 
such grounds would not have been available under any state’s 
law.139 
The court noted that the scope of the civil courts to 
review the arbitration award was extremely limited.140  The 
arbitration agreement was governed by Montanan law, which 
was “substantially identical” to federal law when providing 
the State of New York.” Agreement to Arbitrate, BETH DIN OF AMERICA, 
http://www.bethdin.org/docs/PDF3-Binding_Arbitration_Agreement.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
 136. Interview with Beth Din of America (Oct. 26, 2011) (notes on file with 
author).  Most of the family matters do not involve arbitration, although they 
may have legal effect. 
 137. 141 F. App’x 263 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 138. Id. at 274. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 270. 
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grounds for review.141  Accordingly, judicial review could only 
be granted if the award was procured by corruption, fraud or 
other means; if there was evident partiality on the part of a 
neutral arbitrator; if any of the arbitrators showed evidence 
of corruption or misconduct; or if the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers.142  None of these grounds for review was 
present. 
Other cases involving religious arbitration have likewise 
enforced the awards or the agreement to submit the dispute 
to arbitration, on the grounds that arbitration is favored 
under state and federal policy.  In Abd Alla v. Mourrsi, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that an allegation of fraud 
or corruption in an arbitration process would have to “clearly 
demonstrate” that the award was tainted in order to 
overcome the presumption in favor of the award.143 The 
presumption in favor of the validity of a religious arbitral 
award does not prevent a court from overturning it, however.  
The New York Supreme Court noted in Berg v. Berg that an 
arbitral award could be overturned on public policy grounds if 
a provision of it violated a state statute or regulation.144  In 
this regard, however, religious arbitral awards are simply 
like secular arbitral awards. 
Some courts have, however, considered a First 
Amendment obstacle to enforcing arbitral awards: the 
“religious question” doctrine, which aims to prevent 
“entanglement” of church and state.145  This doctrine is 
considered in the following subsection. 
4. The “Religious Question” Problem and Challenge to 
Arbitration 
It is a tenet of American jurisprudence that civil courts 
should attempt to avoid “religious questions,” which instead 
 141. Id. at 271. 
 142. Id. 
 143. 680 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 144. No. 25099/05, 2008 WL 4155652, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 2008).  A 
married couple submitted their divorce to dispute to arbitration at a Beth Din.  
Id. at *1.  The arbitrator awarded child support that greatly exceeded what 
could have been given under New York’s statute.  Id. at *11–14. 
 145. The aim of preventing “entanglement” is “to prevent, as far as possible, 
the intrusion of [Church or state] into the precincts of the other.”  Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).  As such, it forms one of the three prongs 
of the “Lemon test.”  See id. at 612–13. 
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should be left to the competent religious authorities.  
However, the definition of what is a “religious question” has 
shifted over the years.  In 1871, the Court decided Watson v. 
Jones,146 which arose out of a dispute between a Presbyterian 
congregation in Kentucky and the General Assembly of  
the Presbyterian Church.  The General Assembly had 
consistently supported the Union side in the civil war, and 
expressed views “adverse to the institution of slavery.”147  In 
1865 it decreed that any person who had aided the 
Confederate side in the war should “repent and forsake  
[his] sins” before he could be employed by the church.148  The 
Presbytery of Louisville, Kentucky, denounced the decree of 
the General Assembly, and the congregation of one of the 
churches in its jurisdiction split over the issue.  Each side of 
the former congregation then claimed to be the owner of the 
church.  After conducting an “elaborate examination of the 
principles of Presbyterian church government,” the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals (the highest Kentucky court at that time) 
ruled that the church belonged to the pro-slavery faction, and 
thereby overruled the determination of the General Assembly 
of the Presbyterian Church.149  The anti-slavery faction then 
moved for an injunction in federal court, which was granted, 
and affirmed by the Supreme Court.150  The Court noted that 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals had erred in its ruling since it 
had inquired into a matter “purely ecclesiastical in its 
character.”151 
The Court reiterated the need to avoid “religious 
questions” in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Memorial Church.  In this case, the Court heard an 
appeal from the national Presbyterian Church against a 
Georgia Supreme Court ruling that had given control of two 
Presbyterian church buildings to local congregations.152  The 
Georgia Supreme Court had ruled for the local churches on 
 146. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
 147. Id. at 691. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 734. 
 150. Id. at 735.  The Court upheld the hearing of the suit on the grounds that 
the issue being litigated was different from that in the state courts, there was a 
different named plaintiff, and different rights and remedies were being claimed.  
Id. at 715. 
 151. Id. at 733.  This was dictum, since the ruling did not rely on it. 
 152. 393 U.S. 440, 441 (1969). 
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the “departure from doctrine” theory. This stated that local 
church property was held in trust for the benefit of a general 
church “on the sole condition that the general church adhere 
to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of 
affiliation by the local churches.”153  The Court reversed, 
holding that, because of the First Amendment, no court could 
make the determination of doctrinal questions required in the 
“departure from doctrine” theory.154  
The religious question doctrine was considered in the 
context of arbitration by a Colorado district court in Encore 
Productions v. Promise Keepers.155  The plaintiff, Encore, was 
a provider of meeting services, and the defendant was a 
Christian organization that conducted “meetings and 
conferences for men” in venues throughout the United 
States.156  The contract between the parties stipulated that 
“[a]ny claim or dispute arising from or related to this 
Agreement shall be settled by mediation and, if necessary, 
legally binding arbitration, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure for Christian Conciliation of the Institute for 
Christian Conciliation.”157  When the agreement between the 
parties broke down, the plaintiff sued in district court for 
breach of contract, and the defendant moved to dismiss, citing 
the arbitration clause.158  In response, the plaintiff challenged 
the validity of the contractual provision for Christian 
arbitration services.159 
The court rejected the plaintiff’s claims. It first noted the 
religious question doctrine, but held that it could avoid 
adjudicating religious matters by using “neutral principles,” 
as laid down by the Court in Jones v. Wolf.160  These neutral 
principles were “secular legal rules whose application to 
religious parties or disputes do not entail theological or 
 153. Id. at 443. 
 154. Id. at 449–50. 
 155. 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999). 
 156. Id. at 1106. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1107. 
 159. Id. at 1112.  The plaintiff also challenged the validity of the arbitration 
clause on the grounds that the contract containing the clause had been 
superseded by another contract that lacked it.  Id. at 1108. 
 160. Id. at 1112 (“ ‘ Neutral principles’ are secular legal rules whose 
application to religious parties or disputes do not entail theological or religious 
evaluations.” (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 124 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 124 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
4_WALTER FINAL.DOC 3/22/2012  5:41:29 PM 
2012] RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION 525 
religious evaluations.”161  It then observed that it had only 
“marginal review” over the decisions of religious arbitral 
tribunals, citing Presbyterian Church.162  An agreement to 
arbitrate, the court held, was a secular contractual matter—
and not a question of religious doctrine.163  Therefore, the 
parties should arbitrate, and any problems arising out of the 
arbitration could be reviewed in court later.164 
The decision of the Encore court to dispatch the religious 
question problem is consistent with that of other courts.  In 
Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the argument that 
compelling religious arbitration before a Beth Din would 
violate the religious question doctrine.165  Under the terms of 
a Washington synagogue’s by-laws, a congregation member 
could make a claim against the congregation as a whole to be 
determined by a Beth Din.166  The congregation resisted 
arbitration on the grounds that it would lead to a civil court 
making determinations about religious matters.167  This 
argument was rejected by the court, which said that it was 
“fully satisfied that a civil court can resolve appellants’ action 
to compel arbitration according to objective, well-established, 
neutral principles of law.”168  The court distinguished between 
the underlying dispute to be arbitrated—which was a 
religious matter over which it did not have competence—from 
the agreement to arbitrate itself.169 
5. Other Challenges to Religious Arbitration 
Courts have considered, and rejected, other challenges to 
religious arbitration.  In Encore, the plaintiff argued that the 
use of religious arbitration would “violate their agents’ and 
employees’ rights to the free exercise of their religion under 
the First Amendment.”170  Encore did not claim that its own 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. 869 A.2d 343 (D.C. 2005). 
 166. Id. at 346. 
 167. Id. at 353. 
 168. Id. at 354. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Encore Prod., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1112 (D. 
Colo. 1999). 
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First Amendment rights had been violated, though it might 
have.171  Instead, it claimed that the arbitration agreement it 
had executed was a legal nullity since it forced its employees 
to take part “in proceedings of a religious nature.”172  The 
court had little time for this argument.  It noted that the 
contract had been executed not by the corporation itself but 
by employees on behalf of the corporation—and so the 
corporation could not now claim that those employees were 
being bound against their will.  “The arbitration process . . . 
contemplates participation by [employees].”173 
Attacks based on the remedies that religious tribunals 
may grant have fared little better.  Woodlands Christian 
Academy v. Weibust was the case of a teacher who took action 
against her former employer, a school, for constructive 
dismissal.174  The teacher argued that since the conciliation 
provision in the arbitration clause stated, that “the  
Holy Scriptures (the Bible) shall be the supreme  
authority governing every aspect of the conciliation 
process,”175 this constituted an “unconscionable limitation” on 
the remedies that she should be able to obtain from the Texas 
Commission on Human Rights.176  The appeals court rejected 
this argument, noting first that the conciliation procedure (as 
opposed to the arbitration procedure) was not binding, and 
second that the arbitration agreement clearly stated that the 
terms of any award were unenforceable if they conflicted with 
state or federal law.177  The court therefore upheld the 
enforceability of the arbitration provision. 
A federal district court arrived at a similar result in 
Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schools.178  The court rejected 
the argument of the plaintiff, a former teacher, that 
upholding a Christian conciliation provision would lead to a 
 171. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“The Court has 
recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 172. 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. 
 173. Id. 
 174. No. 09-10-00010-CV, 2010 WL 3910366, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 
2010). 
 175. Id. at *5. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. No. 1:08-cv-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009). 
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forfeiture of her “substantive rights.”179  Even though the 
terms of the conciliation process stated that the Bible was to 
be the “supreme authority” that would govern the 
proceedings, it was sufficient that the terms also obliged the 
conciliators to “take into consideration” secular law.180  The 
plaintiff also failed to show how her procedural rights would 
be impugned by the Christian provision.181  Therefore, the 
court enforced the religious conciliation provision. 
Courts have also been skeptical of arguments that claim 
that religious arbitration has been forced on one party 
through duress.  In Berg v. Berg, a husband in a divorce case 
claimed that he was forced to go to Jewish arbitration by his 
wife since otherwise he would face a siruv, a finding of 
contempt by his rabbi that would entail a “type of ostracism” 
from the religious community.182  The court, citing precedent, 
dismissed this claim.183  In Graves v. George Fox University, a 
court dismissed a claim that a Christian arbitration 
agreement between an employee, an admissions counselor at 
a university, and his employer was procedurally 
unconscionable.184  It stated that there had been no “stark 
inequity” in bargaining power as the plaintiff had alleged, 
and therefore upheld the arbitration agreement.185 
American courts, so far as possible, treat challenges to 
religious arbitration exactly as they would challenges to 
secular arbitration—and exercise the same “presumption . . . 
in favor of arbitration,” even in family law disputes.186  The 
situation is somewhat more complex north of the border, as 
will be shown in the next section. 
B. Canada 
This section examines the status of religious arbitration 
in Canada as a whole.  Following the model of the previous 
section, it examines first the framework for arbitration 
 179. Id. at *3. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. No. 25099/05, 2008 WL 4155652, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 2008). 
 183. Id. (citing Greenberg v. Greenberg, 656 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (App. Div. 
1997); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1991)). 
 184. No. CV06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372, at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 16, 2007). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). 
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generally before addressing religious arbitration specifically.  
As noted previously, family law arbitration in Ontario and 
Québec forms an exception to the general principle in Canada 
that religious arbitration should be enforceable, and will be 
dealt with in the following section. 
1. Framework of Arbitration in Canada 
Until about twenty-five years ago, all arbitration in 
Canada was based on English statutes that dated back to the 
nineteenth century.187  The 1980s, however, saw a broad 
movement to make Canada more attractive to business by 
providing suitable fora for alternative dispute resolution.188  
In 1985, the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) promulgated the Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law).189  The 
following year, Canada became a signatory to the New York 
Convention,190 which requires courts in contracting countries 
to give binding effect to private agreements to arbitrate and 
enforce arbitration awards made in other contract- 
ing states.191  The enactment of this legislation required 
provincial and federal coordination: while the New York 
Convention binds states, the subject matter of commercial 
arbitration is, under Canadian law, largely a provincial 
 187. J. BRIAN CASEY & JANET MILLS, ARBITRATION LAW OF CANADA: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 (2005). 
 188. See Randy A. Pepper, Why Arbitrate?: Ontario’s Recent Experience with 
Commercial Arbitration, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 807, 808–11 (1998). 
 189. Id. at 811.  The Model Law was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1985.  G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985). 
 190. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 6, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (entered into force June 7, 1959).  Canada 
acceded to the Convention on May 12, 1986, and the Convention entered force 
on August 10, 1986. See Status: 1958 – Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2011).  Canada became the sixty-seventh signatory to the Convention, 
behind San Marino, the Central African Republic and the Holy See.  See id. 
 191. Article I provides that “[t]his Convention shall apply to the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a state other than 
the State where the recognition of such awards are sought . . . .”  Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 190, 
at 49.  Article III provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize 
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon . . . .”  Id. 
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affair.192  As a result, each province, save Québec, enacted an 
International Arbitration Act based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law.193 
These International Arbitration Acts were applicable to 
arbitrations that were “inherently commercial in nature and 
‘international’ in scope.”194  They did not, therefore, cover 
domestic disputes, although domestic parties could agree to 
be bound by them.195  When the acts were passed, many 
provinces felt the need to provide a domestic counterpart.196  
The existing arbitration acts, based on the English 
Arbitration Act of 1889, made no distinction between 
domestic and international disputes, and the international 
acts seemed inappropriate for various domestic disputes.197  
Under the international acts, there were very few situations 
in which a court could intervene, and there was no appeal to a 
court unless it was already agreed in the arbitration 
contract.198  While this might be suitable for sophisticated 
international parties, it was generally considered less 
appropriate for domestic parties.199  Many provinces therefore 
decided to adopt domestic arbitration acts in the late eighties 
and early nineties to govern these disputes.200 
 
 
 192. See William C. Graham, International Commercial Arbitration: The 
Developing Canadian Profile, in UNCITRAL ARBITRATION MODEL IN CANADA: 
CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LEGISLATION 93–99 
(Robert K. Paterson & Bonita J. Thompson eds., 1987). 
 193. CASEY & MILLS, supra note 187, at 21. Québec’s arbitration provisions 
are similar, and are found at Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, arts. 940–
951.2 (Can.). 
 194. CASEY & MILLS, supra note 187, at 21. 
 195. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Docs A/40/17 annex 
1 & A/61/17 annex 1, 2 (2008), available at http://www.uncitral.org/ 
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_EBOOK.pdf (“An arbitration is 
international if . . . the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of 
the arbitration dispute relates to more than one country.”). 
 196. CASEY & MILLS, supra note 187, at 23. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 21.  New domestic arbitration acts were passed by Alberta, British 
Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Québec and 
Saskatchewan. The remaining two provinces—Newfoundland and Labrador, 
and Prince Edward Island—still use arbitration statutes based on the English 
act of 1889. 
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The passage of the international arbitration acts led to a 
definite shift in favor of arbitration in Canada.201 Both 
arbitration agreements and awards can only be reviewed by 
courts in limited circumstances.  Under Ontario’s 
International Arbitration Act, for example, an arbitration 
agreement may be set aside if one party entered into the 
agreement while under a legal incapacity, the agreement is 
“invalid,” the subject matter of the dispute cannot be resolved 
by arbitration under Ontario law, or the arbitration 
agreement does not apply to the dispute.202  Once an 
arbitration has taken place, a party appealing to overturn the 
award may attempt to argue that the arbitration agreement 
itself was defective, or may show fraud or a procedural 
defect.203 
Religious arbitration agreements are prima facie 
enforceable in Canada.  In Popack v. Lipszyc, for example, 
two Ontario businessmen had agreed to submit a property 
dispute to arbitration at a Beth Din, pursuant to the 
International Arbitration Act.204  The plaintiff then brought 
an action in civil court, arguing that the tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction over the dispute and could not grant all of the 
relief sought.205  The judge held that the burden was on the 
plaintiff to prove that the arbitration could not be performed 
by the Beth Din, and that he had failed to do so.206 
In Grunbaum v. Grunbaum, a Québec court was asked to 
enforce a judgment handed down by a Beth Din concerning 
the use of an apartment in Jerusalem.207  The Beth Din had 
given an initial judgment, but then, having heard new 
evidence, announced that the judges were “resign[ing] from 
the case and [did] not wish to continue presiding over this 
case.”208  They urged the parties to go to “another rabbinical 
court in another jurisdiction” to resolve the matter.209  The 
Québec court refused to enforce this award, on the grounds 
 201. See Ontario v. Abilities Frontier Co-operative Homes Inc., 1996 
CarswellOnt 2720, para. 27 (Can. Ont. C.J.) (WL). 
 202. International Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 48 (Can.). 
 203. Id. § 46. 
 204. 2008 CarswellOnt 5184, para. 3 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.) (WL). 
 205. Id. at para. 1. 
 206. Id. at paras. 33–34. 
 207. 2002 CarswellQue 729 (Can. C.S. Qué.) (WL). 
 208. Id. at para. 5. 
 209. Id. 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 127 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 127 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
4_WALTER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  4:16:34 PM 
2012] RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION 531 
that it was not a judgment susceptible of enforcement.210  
However, the court acknowledged that, in theory, religious 
arbitral awards could be enforced just like any other arbitral 
awards.211 
2. Challenges to Religious Arbitration in Canada 
Canadian courts, like their American counterparts, 
acknowledge a “religious question” doctrine—a desire to leave 
religious matters to the religious authorities.  As a leading 
commentator has said, courts in Canada “will not consider 
matters that are strictly spiritual or narrowly doctrinal in 
nature.”212  The application of this principle can be seen in the 
case of Reed v. Regina.213  In Reed, the plaintiff, a Jehovah’s 
Witness, was aggrieved at the practice of the congregation to 
which he belonged of holding disciplinary proceedings in 
camera, and he asked the court to declare that holding these 
proceedings in private violated the right to freedom of religion 
that was enshrined in Canada’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms.214  The court rejected the claim. It 
noted that, on the contrary, to interfere in the affairs of the 
religious tribunals of the Jehovah’s Witnesses would harm, 
not protect, freedom of religion—and so the plaintiff’s claim 
was not justiciable.215 
However, courts will intervene to protect property, 
contract or civil rights when the subject matter happens to be 
religious in nature.216  In McCaw v. United Church of 
 210. Id. at para. 14. 
 211. The court discussed the principles of homologation, the French term for 
finalizing an arbitral decree before a court.  It treated the award simply as a 
sentence arbitrale.  Id. at para. 10.  It did not consider that it had any special 
status by being a religious award. 
 212. M.H. OGILVIE, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW IN CANADA 218 
(2d ed. 2003). 
 213. [1989] 3 F.C. 259 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.). 
 214. Id. at para. 2. 
 215. Id. at  para. 10. 
 216. See, e.g., Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church v. Ukrainian Greek 
Orthodox Cathedral of St. Mary the Protectress, [1940] S.C.R. 586, para. 591 
(Can.) (“[I]t is well settled that, unless some property or civil right is affected 
thereby, the civil courts of this country will not allow their process to be used for 
the enforcement of a purely ecclesiastical decree or order.”).  Civil courts can 
enforce contract rights in addition to civil or property rights, if the contract 
right is deemed sufficiently important.  See, e.g., Lakeside Colony of Hutterian 
Brethren v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165 (Can.). 
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Canada, an Ontario court was asked to rule on whether a 
pastor who had been sacked from his church had a valid 
employment claim against the church.217  The crux of the 
pastor’s claim was that the church had not adhered to the 
“law of the church” as laid out in the church’s “manual.”218  
Nevertheless, the court felt free to interpret the manual, and 
thus hold that the church had acted wrongly in sacking the 
pastor. 
Another example of Canadian courts’ willingness to 
intervene in religious disputes to protect parties’ civil or 
property rights can be found in Lakeside Colony of Hutterian 
Brethren v. Hofer.219  A Hutterite colony had expelled four 
members of the colony, and attempted to obtain a court order 
to enforce that expulsion.220  Because Hutterite colonies 
practice communal ownership of property, expulsion 
effectively stripped them of all their worldly goods.221  The 
colony members resisted expulsion on the grounds that the 
manner of the expulsion denied them “the right of natural 
justice.”222  The Canadian Supreme Court, reversing the 
decision of the lower courts, held that the colony members’ 
rights of “natural justice” had been denied since they were not 
given the chance to defend themselves at the meeting at 
which they were expelled.223 
Cases involving requirements to appear before religious 
tribunals are naturally rarer than religious question cases. 
The leading case that deals with such a requirement is 
Marcovitz v. Bruker, where the Canadian Supreme Court was 
asked to rule on an agreement between two individuals to 
appear before a Beth Din to obtain a get, a Jewish divorce.224  
The plaintiff and defendant were observant Jews who had 
been married for eleven years before beginning divorce 
proceedings in 1980.225  Under the terms of the civil divorce 
 217. [1991] 4 O.R. (3d) 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 218. Id. at para. 11. 
 219. Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren, 3 S.C.R. 165. 
 220. Id. at para. 3–4.  Three other defendants had also been expelled, but, 
being young persons who had not yet been baptized, they were not considered 
members of the colony.  Id. at para. 3. 
 221. Id. at para. 23. 
 222. [1989] 62 Man. R. (2d) 194, para. 28 (Can.). 
 223. 3 S.C.R. 165 at para. 81. 
 224. [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.). 
 225. Id. at paras. 21–23. 
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agreement that they signed, the husband, Marcovitz, was 
obliged to appear before a Beth Din to obtain the get.226  
However, he refused. 
After nine years of waiting, Bruker began proceedings in 
Québec court for breach of the divorce agreement.227  She did 
not sue to obtain the get, but for damages for breach of the 
agreement, which had prevented her from entering into a new 
religious marriage.228  Marcovitz demurred.229  Six years later, 
however—and fifteen years after the civil divorce—he granted 
Bruker the get.230  Bruker nevertheless continued in her claim 
for damages.231  The trial court found that although the 
granting or otherwise of the get was a religious matter, the 
fact that the husband had agreed to grant the get as part of a 
civil divorce contract “ ‘ moved [the case] into the realm of the 
civil courts.’ ” 232  The judge stated that the “pith and essence” 
of what was being demanded in the case was not religious, 
and so the court could adjudicate the matter without 
examining “principles of Jewish law . . . in depth.”233  The 
court awarded Bruker CAD 47,500 in damages (rather than 
the CAD 500,000 that she had sought).234 
The court of appeals came to the opposite conclusion.235  
For the appellate court, “the substance of the . . . obligation 
[was] moral in nature, irrespective of the form in which the 
obligation [was] stated.”236  The court held that if the plaintiff 
was forced to pay damages for not granting the get, this would 
interfere with his right to exercise his religion as he saw fit.237 
The Canadian Supreme Court reversed. It held, over a 
vigorous dissent, that failure to grant a get was a justiciable 
 226. Id. at paras. 23–24.  Under Jewish law, a woman cannot obtain a get on 
her own.  Id. at para. 16. 
 227. Id. at para. 26. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at para. 27. 
 230. Id. at para. 29. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at para. 31 (quoting Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2003] R.J.Q. 1189, para. 
19 (Qué. S.C.) (Can.)). 
 233. Id. at para. 31 (quoting Marcovitz, R.J.Q. 1189 at para. 30). 
 234. Id. at para. 33. 
 235. Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2005] R.J.Q. 2482 (Qué. C.A.) (Can.). 
 236. Id. at para. 76. 
 237. Id. at para. 77 (“[W]ho is this Court to tell [Marcovitz] that he had a civil 
duty to perform irrespective of the rights he might have according to his 
religious beliefs?”). 
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matter.238  The court considered that Marcovitz’s right of 
freedom of religion had to be balanced with the harm that, 
under Jewish law, was caused to his wife by his not granting 
the get—in particular, the fact that she could not remarry 
under Jewish law and her children would be illegitimate.239  
The court looked to the legislative history of the federal 
Divorce Act in making its judgment, and observed that the 
Act specifically aimed to protect Jewish women.240 
Marcovitz can be read as disposing of one principal 
objection that may be made to religious arbitration—namely, 
that agreements to appear before religious tribunals are not 
justiciable in civil court.  The court held that the agreement 
to appear before the Beth Din was a secular contractual 
matter that it was permitted to adjudicate.  However, 
Marcovitz is less clear on whether forcing someone to attend a 
religious tribunal would in fact be a violation of that person’s 
rights.  The court was only faced with the issue of damages: 
the husband had already granted the get, and so there was no 
question of attempting to enforce his agreement to appear 
before the Beth Din.  One commentator has surmised that an 
attempt to force the husband to appear before the Beth Din 
“would have likely been rendered by the Court as an 
impermissible breach of the husband’s constitutionally 
protected freedom of religion.”241 
3. Family Arbitration in Ontario and Québec 
As noted above, the rules governing religious arbitration 
of family matters in Ontario and Québec are different from 
those governing arbitration of non-family matters in those 
provinces, and also from the rules governing family 
arbitration in other Canadian provinces.242 
 238. Marcovitz, 3 S.C.R. 607, paras. 39–47 (Can.). 
 239. Id. at para. 4. 
 240. Id. at para. 7. 
 241. Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious 
Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 573, 595 n.52 (2008). 
 242. This Article does not attempt to provide a detailed overview of every 
Canadian province.  However, for the sake of completeness, a brief overview of 
the laws in British Columbia and Alberta, the next two provinces by size of 
population after Ontario and Québec, is given here.  These provinces do not 
have laws that single out religious arbitration, or arbitration in family matters.  
Religious arbitration is treated equally in British Columbia with all other types 
of arbitration.  The Commercial Arbitration Act governs all domestic 
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i. Ontario’s Arbitration Act of 1991 
Ontario responded to the need for new domestic 
arbitration legislation with its Arbitration Act of 1991.  The 
Act made binding and enforceable all arbitrations within 
Ontario, unless they were commercial disputes between 
international parties, and thus preempted by the 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, or they fell within 
discrete areas of law that were outside the scope of 
arbitration.243  Courts had more discretion to set aside awards 
than they would under the New York Convention—for 
example, they could intervene merely “to prevent unfair or 
unequal treatment of parties”—but arbitration was still a 
largely independent affair.244  The Arbitration Act provided 
for binding domestic arbitration within the province with 
arbitrations. R.S.B.C. 2011, c.55 (Can.) (originally enacted as S.B.C. 1986, c.3 
(Can.)).  Despite its name, the Act states that it applies not only to arbitration 
agreements in commercial settings, but also to “any other arbitration 
agreement.”  Id. § 2(1)(c).  Courts may set aside an award in order to “prevent a 
miscarriage of justice.”  Id. § 31(2)(a).  Unlike Québec and Ontario, there is no 
statute that bars the use of arbitration in family contexts.  However, the use of 
arbitration in family disputes is extremely rare—possibly because there is 
uncertainty as to whether non-commercial disputes can be covered in a 
“commercial arbitration” act.  See CATHERINE MORRIS, ARBITRATION OF FAMILY 
LAW DISPUTES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 10–11 (Jul. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.bcjusticereview.org/working_groups/family_justice/paper_07_07_04.
pdf.  A government review has proposed amending the law to bring family 
disputes definitively within the scope of arbitration.  MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, WHITE PAPER ON FAMILY RELATIONS ACT REFORM 18 (July 2010), 
available at http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/legislation/pdf/Family-Law-White-Paper 
.pdf.  However, British Columbia has seen little of the controversy over religious 
arbitration that affected Ontario and to a lesser degree Québec.  The status of 
religious arbitration in Alberta is similar to that in British Columbia.  The 
Arbitration Act governs all arbitrations unless they are covered by the 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, the arbitration is excluded by law, or 
the parties exclude the application of the act. R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43, § 2(1) (Can.).  
The exclusions by law cover areas such as labor relations and collective 
bargaining—where provisions for arbitration are laid down in separate codes. 
Id. at § 2(3).  For the separate provisions for arbitration, see, for example, 
Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1, §§ 93–104 (Can.); Police Officers 
Collective Bargaining Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-18, §§ 9–19 (Can.).  Courts may, as 
in British Columbia, overturn arbitral awards.  However, review is very limited. 
If parties have referred a question of law to the tribunal, this cannot be 
reviewed by a court.  R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43, § 44(3).  Awards may also be reviewed 
if one party has been treated “manifestly unfairly and unequally.”  Id. § 45(1)(f).  
However, there has been little or no controversy about religious arbitration in 
Alberta, and it is sanctioned in all circumstances by law. 
 243. S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 2(1) (Can.). 
 244. S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 6 (Can.). 
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“anyone as an arbitrator and any law as the criterion for 
resolution.”245   
Importantly, family law arbitrations fell within the scope 
of the 1991 Act.  Ontario’s pre-existing arbitration law had 
not prevented this: private religious tribunals could give 
binding judgments, so long as their judgments did not 
contradict Canadian law.246  However, the requirement that 
judgments conform to Canadian law was missing from the 
Arbitration Act.247  For the first time, it seemed possible for 
religious tribunals to make binding decisions in divorce and 
inheritance cases that favored one party on grounds of sex, 
seniority of birth, or other characteristics that would not be 
judicially recognized under secular Canadian law. 
For the first dozen years of the Act, there was no 
controversy. Ontario’s Jewish community had Batei Din, 
which operated for many years without attracting unwanted 
attention.248  Prior to 1991, these had served their own 
religious communities, handing down judgments based on 
religious principles but without enjoying automatic state 
enforcement.  For example, the Halakhah (Jewish law) does 
not lay down rules for the division of a couple’s assets in 
divorce, instead allowing the divorce to take place according 
to the terms of the ketubah (marriage contract).249  The 
ketubah may simply state that the husband is to return the 
dowry that the wife has brought to the marriage, and any 
concomitant gifts.250  On the other hand, under Ontarian law, 
a spouse in a divorce is entitled to half of the increase in 
 245. Shelley McGill, Religious Tribunals and the Ontario Arbitration Act, 
1991: The Catalyst for Change, 20 J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 53, 54 (2005). 
 246. R.S.O. 1980, c. 25 (Can.). 
 247. S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 32(1) (Can.) (“In deciding a dispute, an arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties or, if none are 
designated, the rules of law it considers appropriate in the circumstances.”). 
 248. Both Toronto and Ottawa have Batei Din.  See Beth Din Orthodox, 
Toronto, JEWISH IN TORONTO, http://www.jewishinto.com/Beth-Din-
Orthodox.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); Reb Arie, Courting Public Opinion, 
TIKKUN DAILY (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.tikkun.org/tikkundaily/2009/08/14/ 
courting-public-opinion; see also Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: 
Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their 
Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 449 (2006) (noting 
presence of Jewish and Christian arbitration services in Ontario prior to 1991). 
 249. See LOUIS M. EPSTEIN, THE JEWISH MARRIAGE CONTRACT: A STUDY IN 
THE STATUS OF THE WOMAN IN JEWISH LAW 207–23 (photo. reprint 1973) (1927). 
 250. Id. 
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value of the assets of the couple during the marriage.251  
Similarly, Jewish inheritance law may frequently conflict 
with secular Ontarian law. Under the Halakhah, if there are 
both sons and daughters, the daughters will receive nothing 
from an estate, except, under certain conditions, their 
wedding expenses.252  However, if an individual dies intestate 
in Ontario, his or her children inherit equally regardless  
of sex;253 even in the case of testate succession, a party who 
has been neglected can challenge a will.254 
Before 1991, the possibility of Beth Din judgments that 
violated these laws was not considered problematic since an 
aggrieved party would always have recourse to the civil 
courts.  Post-1991, the Orthodox Jewish Beth Din of Toronto 
responded to the change by asking the parties to any dispute 
in family matters to sign an agreement that any award that 
would be enforceable in court “must be made in accordance 
with the civil requirements of Canada’s national and 
provincial family legislation.”255  By voluntarily complying 
with secular norms, the Toronto Beth Din succeeded in 
averting a clash with civil courts.256 
ii. The Controversy in Ontario over Religious 
Arbitral Tribunals 
The situation changed in 2003 when the Canadian 
Society of Muslims founded the Islamic Institute of Civil 
Justice to serve as a binding arbitration board for Muslims, 
including in family disputes.257  Islamic family law contains 
features that cannot be reconciled with Western civil justice 
systems. Under Islamic law, a male inherits twice as much as 
 251. Family Law Act R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, § 5(1).  “Equalization” of net family 
properties is defined as the value of property owned by each party on the date of 
divorce, minus the value of the property that that party owned on the date of 
marriage.  Id. § 4(1). 
 252. Benjamin C. Wolf, Note, Resolving the Conflict Between Jewish and 
Secular Estate Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1171, 1176–77 (2009). 
 253. Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, § 44. 
 254. Id. § 60. 
 255. Shachar, supra note 241, at 603. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Judy Van Rhijn, First Steps Taken for Islamic Arbitration Board 
(Canada), LAW TIMES NEWS (Nov. 25, 2003, 1:37 PM), http://www.freerepublic 
.com/focus/f-news/1028843/posts. 
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a female.258  Since this is a Qur’anic injunction, and not a 
legal ruling by scholars, it cannot be ignored.259  In divorce 
cases, a man is bound to give his wife the amount of money 
(mahr) agreed in the marriage contract; this amount may 
sometimes be symbolic.260  Although these provisions have 
elements in common with Jewish law, the possibility that 
Islamic arbitration awards might be enforceable in secular 
courts spooked the Ontario public and politicians and led to a 
backlash.261 
The following year, the Ontarian government asked the 
former Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd to review the 
1991 Arbitration Act and religious tribunals operating 
pursuant to it.262  Noting that “religious arbitration is already 
being conducted by several different faiths,” she 
recommended that arbitration be permitted to continue, 
subject to certain safeguards.263  These safeguards included 
greater judicial review: a court would be permitted to set 
aside an arbitral award on grounds of unconscionability if it 
did not adequately protect the rights of children or if it had 
infringed rights to “fair and equal treatment.”264  
Furthermore, parties to arbitration would have to sign an 
agreement before the arbitration stating that they were 
aware under what law the arbitration was being conducted, 
and that they were aware it was voluntary.265 
 258. Qur’an 4:12 (“Allah commands you regarding your children: a male shall 
have as much as the share of two females.” (2 THE HOLY QUR’AN 501, Hazrat 
Mirza Tahir Ahmad trans., Islam Int’l Publications 1988)). 
 259. Id. (“This fixing of portions is from Allah.”). 
 260. RAFFIA ARSHAD, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 133 (2010). 
 261. The relatively swift increase in the Muslim population of Ontario in the 
1990s may have contributed to a greater sensitivity among Ontarians about 
making Islamic law binding.  In 1991, almost 146,000 Ontarians identified as 
Muslims; by 2001, this had more than doubled to about 353,000, 3% of the 
population.  Canada Census: Major Religious Denominations, Ontario, 1991 and 
2001, http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Analytic/companion/ 
rel/tables/provs/onmajor.cfm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).  On the other hand, the 
numbers of Christians and Jews increased slightly, but in line with general 
population growth, remaining at around 80% and 2% of the population 
respectively.  Id. 
 262. MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING 
CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION 1 (2004),  available at http://www.attorney 
general.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesummary.pdf. 
 263. Id. at 3. 
 264. Id. at 4–5. 
 265. Id. at 4. 
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These protections did not satisfy the critics of the 
provision.266  The political pressure led to Ontario Premier 
Dalton McGuinty announcing in September 2005 that all 
religious arbitration would be banned.267  He announced in 
uncompromising language: “There will be no shariah law in 
Ontario.  There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario.  
There will be one law for all Ontarians.”268  The Family Law 
Amendment Act, enacted in 2006, defined “family arbitration” 
as being “conducted exclusively in accordance with the law of 
Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction.”269 
iii. The Rationale for the Prohibition of Arbitration 
in Family Disputes in Ontario 
The decision to ban religious tribunals in Ontario was 
taken in response to political pressure that resulted in 
demonstrations outside Canadian embassies and consulates 
in cities around the world.270  Both women’s and Muslim 
groups objected to the existence of binding religious 
arbitration.  For example, the Muslim Canadian Congress 
argued that the religious arbitration law would permit 
“religious clerics . . . to turn back the clock and use the 
judicial system to enforce their waning authority over 
vulnerable communities.”271  The Canadian Council of Muslim 
Women commissioned a study on the issue 272 and castigated 
Marion Boyd for overlooking the “impending negative impact 
on vulnerable women and children of government-sanctioned 
establishment of ‘Sharia’ tribunals in Ontario.”273  The 
 266. See Religious Law in Canada; Catholics and Mission, THE  
RELIGION REPORT (Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.abc.net.au/radionational 
/programs/religionreport/religious-law-in-canadacatholics-and-mission/3364436. 
 267. Ontario Will Ban Shariah Arbitrations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2005), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904E4DB1031F931A2575AC0
A9639C8B63. 
 268. Id. 
 269. S.O. 1991, c. 1, § 1(1) (Can.). 
 270. See, e.g., Sharia Move in Canada Draws Anger, BBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 
2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4226758.stm. 
 271. Press Release, Muslim Canadian Congress, MCC Welcomes Government 
Bill to End Religious Arbitration (Nov. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/20051115.pdf. 
 272. Natasha Bakht, Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining 
Ontario’s Arbitration Act and Its Impact on Women, 1 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM. 
RTS. 1, 2 (2004). 
 273. Press Release, Canadian Council of Muslim Women, Initial Response to 
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Canadian Federation of University Women said that making 
religious arbitration binding would lead to a “two-tier system 
of law that [would] discriminate against women, particularly 
minority and immigrant women.”274  The National Association 
of Women and the Law claimed that “most religions can be 
interpreted as endorsing male domination and female 
inferiority” and so the government sanction of “religious 
decision-making as part of the legal order would very often 
condone the commission or the perpetuation of potential 
discriminations.”275  A total of fifty-three organizations put 
their names to a declaration stating that the Boyd Report 
would “sanction the erosion of women’s equality rights under 
the laws of Ontario.”276 
The exact reason for the decision to back away from 
religious tribunals in Ontario is unclear.277  Dalton McGuinty, 
Ontario’s premier, spoke of the use of religious law in binding 
arbitration as “threaten[ing] our common ground.”278  The 
overwhelming pressure for the ban came from “well-
organized, politically savvy women’s groups . . . who framed 
the issue in terms of women’s equality rights being violated 
by a multiculturalism gone mad.”279  One commentator has 
described the decision as being informed by “the prospect of 
tension, if not a direct clash, between religious and secular 
norms governing the family—and the fear that women’s hard-
won equal rights would be the main casualties of such a 
showdown.”280 
Marion Boyd’s Report on the Arbitration Act (Dec. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.ccmw.com/press/press_room_2004.html. 
 274. ONTARIO COUNCIL OF CANADIAN FEDERATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, 
COMMENTS ON THE BOYD REVIEW AND THE ARBITRATION ACT 3 (2005), available 
at http://www.cfuwontcouncil.ca/Reports/boyd.pdf. 
 275. Andrée Côté, An Open Letter Opposing the Use of Arbitration and  
Faith-Based Tribunals in Family Law in Ontario, 23 JURISFEMME 3 (Feb. 24, 
2005), available at http://www.nawl.ca/en/newlibrarypage/jurisfemme/64-
jfvolume232005/230-an-open-letter-opposing-the-use-of-arbitration-a-faith-
based-tribunals-in-family-law-in-ontario. 
 276. Declaration on Religious Arbitration in Family Law, YWCA CANADA, 
http://ywcacanada.ca/data/publications/00000019.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
 277. Harvey Simmons, One Law for All Ontarians, TORONTO STAR, Sep. 14, 
2010, at A21. 
 278. Sharia Law Move Quashed in Canada, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4236762.stm. 
 279. Simmons, supra note 277, at A1. 
 280. Shachar, supra note 241, at 584. 
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Legal analysis largely focused on those provisions of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom that could be used 
to protect women’s rights.281  Section 15(1) of the Charter 
states that “[e]very individual is equal before and under the 
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on . . . sex.”282  Section 28 
emphasizes the commitment to sex equality, providing that 
“all the freedoms referred to in [the Charter] are guaranteed 
equally to male and female persons.”283  These provisions 
could be used in a challenge arguing that “the lack of limits in 
the Arbitration Act permitting family law matters to be 
arbitrated upon using an alternative legal framework to 
Ontario’s family law regime is discriminatory because of its 
adverse impact on women.”284 
A second legal argument against binding religious 
arbitration focused not on the risk of sex discrimination, but 
on freedom of religion, the topic of this Article.  The argument 
suggested that religious arbitration might be inconsistent 
with freedom of religion, since it could infringe “individual 
liberty and subjective choice in the interpretation of religious 
norms.”285  Since each person has the right to interpret a 
religious precept as he or she chooses, giving a religious order 
legal effect “could force an individual to act contrary to her 
belief.”286  A legal challenge to the Arbitration Act never 
materialized, however, and arguments based on religious 
freedom were secondary to arguments focused on equality 
and women’s rights. 
iv. Religious Arbitration in Québec 
The status of religious arbitration in Québec is similar to 
that in Ontario: it may not be used for “family” disputes, but 
is otherwise permitted. Québec’s arbitration laws are 
embedded in the Québec civil code.287  The code explicitly 
provides that “[d]isputes over the status and capacity of 
 281. See Bakht, supra note 272. 
 282. Charter, supra note 2, § 15(1). 
 283. Id. § 28. 
 284. Bakht, supra note 272, at 20. 
 285. See Côté, supra note 275. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c.64, arts. 2638–2643. 
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persons, family matters or other matters of public order may 
not be submitted to arbitration.”288  That did not stop the 
Assemblée Nationale of Québec from unanimously adopting a 
motion in 2005 that there should be no religious arbitration 
in family matters in Québec—and in the rest of Canada for 
good measure.289  The proponent of the motion, Fatima 
Houda-Pepin, cited Article 15 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, and asserted bluntly: “Les victims de la 
charia ont un visage humain, et ce sont les femmes 
musulmanes.”290 
However, there is no provision that states that religious 
arbitration may not be used for commercial matters.  In fact, 
Québec gives great deference to arbitral awards.  Domestic 
arbitral awards can only be overturned in court for the same 
reasons as international awards—namely, certain procedural 
defaults.291  A court is not permitted to enquire into the 
merits of the case.  Therefore, religious arbitration in Québec 
is entirely possible and is treated equally with non-religious 
arbitration. 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION 
This Part discusses arguments that may be made against 
religious arbitration.  It first considers the arguments that 
have traditionally been made against religious arbitration.  
These are the lack of substantive protections for certain 
parties, particularly women, and the lack of procedural 
protections (for example, the dangers of arbitral bias).  It 
shows why these arguments are not legally sufficient to 
undermine the status of religious arbitration in either the 
United States or Canada.  It then suggests a stronger 
argument against religious arbitration, based on the 
constitutional right—in both the United States and Canada—
to the free exercise of religion.  It argues that religious 
arbitration has the effect of limiting freedom of religion, and 
therefore it should be used only when the dispute has a 
religious subject matter that civil courts are not equipped to 
 288. Id. at art. 2639. 
 289. MICHEL VENNE, L’ANNUAIRE DU QUEBEC 2006 at 212–13 (2007). 
 290. Id. at 214 (“The victims of Sharia have a human face, and are Muslim 
women.”). 
 291. CASEY & MILLS, supra note 187, at 30. 
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handle. 
A. Traditional Arguments Against Religious Arbitration 
1. United States 
The arguments that are made against religious 
arbitration concerning women’s rights are inherently 
attractive.  As noted in Part II.C, religious codes frequently 
contain provisions that discriminate against females.  
Furthermore, the composition of religious tribunals 
themselves is problematic.  Under Jewish law, for example, 
women cannot serve as judges.292  The same generally applies 
to Islamic tribunals.293  Under American law, of course, sexual 
discrimination in the selection of judges is forbidden—and 
juries must contain a “fair cross-section” of society.294  Hence, 
these might appear to be two reasons why binding religious 
arbitration risks being unlawful. 
However, neither reason is sufficient to make religious 
arbitration generally unconstitutional.  In the United States, 
religious arbitration is only enforceable in court if it does not 
conflict with secular law.  The Supreme Court recently 
restated the principle that “a substantive waiver of federal 
civil rights will not be upheld” in an arbitration agreement.295  
However, courts are reluctant to interfere with arbitration on 
procedural grounds alone.296  If one party believes that there 
 292. QUINT, supra note 81, at 52 (noting, however, that a woman can be a 
judge if the litigants have asked her to be). 
 293. See, e.g., MAI YAMANI, FEMINISM AND ISLAM: LEGAL AND LITERARY 
PERSPECTIVES  211 (1996) (reporting Speaker of Iranian Parliament saying that 
judges must be male).  But see Ilene R. Prusher, New Female Judge Transforms 
Islamic Court, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (May 13, 2009),  
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0513/p06s20-wome.html 
(describing appointment of first two female judges to Islamic court in West 
Bank); Vaudine England, Malaysian Groups Welcome First Islamic Women 
Judges, BBC NEWS (July 9, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10567857 
(describing appointment of first female judges to Islamic courts in Malaysia). 
 294. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).  Taylor held that a state 
law that provided that women could only serve as jurors if they had opted in to 
the jury pool was unconstitutional.  Id. at 530–31. 
 295. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009).  In Easterly v. 
Heritage Christian Schools, the judge noted that the correct remedy for a waiver 
of rights was after the arbitration act had taken place, not before. No. 1:08-cv-
1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009). 
 296. See, e.g., Penn v. Ryan’s Family of Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 758 
(7th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled that the FAA 
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is a procedural defect in the arbitration that has weakened its 
rights, the party needs to clearly demonstrate this in order to 
obtain relief. Courts do not like “speculating” about the 
potential procedural defects.297  Nor do they entertain 
presumptions that an arbitral panel will be biased.298  As 
noted earlier, the consistent policy of courts has been to 
construe arbitration provisions “liberally.”299  Therefore, the 
arguments advanced by the opponents of religious arbitration 
are legally inadequate in the United States.  Awards that 
clash with “public policy” or show “manifest disregard for the 
law,” as noted above, will not be enforced—but this is not 
sufficient legally to ban religious arbitration ex ante. 
2. Canada 
This subsection will deal first with substantive 
protections for arbitration in Canada generally, and will then 
focus on specific substantive protections that apply to family 
law in Ontario. 
Under Canadian law, arbitration proceedings that violate 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms may be 
appealed in a civil court.  In the early 1990s, the Canadian 
Supreme Court established the proposition that arbitral 
tribunals had a duty to abide by, and interpret, the Charter.  
In Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Ass’n v. Douglas College, the 
court held that “there cannot be a Constitution for arbitrators 
and another for the courts.”300  The court has more recently 
held that any arbitral tribunal that is competent to interpret 
law is obligated to consider the Charter.301  Lower provincial 
courts have followed suit in interpreting the Charter in 
considering arbitration awards.  In 2004, an Ontario trial 
leaves no room for judicial hostility to arbitration proceedings and that courts 
should not presume, absent concrete proof to the contrary, that arbitration 
systems will be unfair or biased.”). 
 297. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000). 
 298. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (“ ‘ [W]e 
decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body 
conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, 
conscientious and impartial arbitrators.’ ”  (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985))). 
 299. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627. 
 300. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, para. 76 (Can.). 
 301. Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Comp. Bd.), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, paras. 
35–37 (Can.). 
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court quashed a ruling of an arbitral tribunal that had denied 
severance payment to a hospital employee who left her work 
after a long period of sick leave.302  The court cited Subsection 
15(1) of the Charter, which prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of disability.303 
Given this, there seems little reason to be concerned that 
religious arbitration in Canada would lead to grave injustices: 
awards that seem unconstitutional can be appealed in a civil 
court.  These protections apply both to family and non-family 
arbitration, as will be discussed now with reference to the 
case of Ontario.  A core feature of Ontario’s 1991 Arbitration 
Act, as noted above, is that it was possible for the parties to 
choose religious law for binding non-commercial arbitration.  
However, the argument of the opponents of the law—that this 
would lead to outcomes that were unjust—was not well-
founded. 
Under Section 6(a) of the Act, courts were permitted to 
intervene “to prevent unequal or unfair treatment of parties 
to arbitration agreements.”304  Section 6(a) was waivable, 
according to Section 3, which concerned the rights of parties 
to opt out of agreements.305  Parties were permitted to exclude 
almost all of the “default” provisions of the Arbitration Act.  
However, Section 3 specifically barred parties from excluding 
from their arbitration contract Section 19 of the Act—which 
states that “[i]n an arbitration, the parties shall be treated 
equally and fairly.”306 
This provision was not a dead letter. In 2001, the Ontario 
Superior Court held in Hercus v. Hercus that the notion of 
equality and fairness was not limited to “procedural fairness,” 
and that a case should be remanded for trial when the 
arbitrator appeared biased to one party.307  In Hercus, a 
divorced couple had agreed to undertake binding arbitration 
to resolve issues of custody and access rights to their two 
children.  The court considered that the arbitrator had 
favored the father of the children by concealing information 
from the mother, and so breached her rights under Section 19 
 302. Ontario Nurses’ Ass’n v. Mount Sinai Hosp., [2004] 69 O.R. (3d) 267. 
 303. Id. at para. 20. 
 304. S.O. 1991, c. 17, § 6(a). 
 305. Id. § 3. 
 306. Id. § 19. 
 307. 2001 CarswellOnt 452, paras. 75, 99 (Can. Ont. S. Ct J.) (WL). 
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of the Act.308 
In addition, the Hercus court suggested that a further 
reason to overturn an apparently binding award might be 
that it involved family law.  The court noted the deference 
that should be given to arbitration agreements, but then 
observed that the Act “governs all kinds of disputes, typically 
but not exclusively, commercial.  Its terms about enforcing 
arbitration clauses and awards are not framed particularly 
for family law and still less are they drawn for custody and 
access matters.”309  The court then stated that, in custody 
matters, it would permit itself to overturn a binding award to 
serve “the best interests of a child.”310 
Hercus relied in part on Duguay v. Thompson-Duguay, 
another Ontario case, where a judge overturned an 
arbitration award between a divorced couple that was the 
result of unjust arbitration proceedings.311  The couple had, as 
in Hercus, entered arbitration to resolve access rights to their 
children—although the mother had not signed the arbitration 
agreement, and had entered the process unwillingly.312  
Duguay did not rely on Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 
although the court noted its counterpart, Section 6, which 
gives a court the right to intervene “to prevent unfair or 
unequal treatment of parties.”313 
Duguay and Hercus together show that Ontario courts 
were prepared to use their inherent parens patriae power, 
and the powers given to them under the Arbitration Act, to 
enjoin “unfair and unequal” treatment and prevent unjust 
outcomes to minors in the arbitration process.  It is unlikely 
that this power would not have been extended to cover women 
generally if, as planned, Islamic arbitration tribunals had 
been set up and rendered judgments that were considered 
biased towards men. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that there would have been 
any procedural defects based on the sole use of male 
arbitrators that would have rendered the judgments 
unenforceable.  The Canadian Supreme Court has held that 
 308. Id. at paras. 128–42. 
 309. Id. at para. 76. 
 310. Id. 
 311. 2000 CarswellOnt 1462 (Can.) (WL). 
 312. Id. at paras. 39–40. 
 313. Id. at para. 28. 
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the perception of bias is sufficient to invalidate the choice of 
an arbitrator.314  However, no Canadian case has dealt with 
bias simply on account of an arbitrator’s sex—and any 
presumptive challenge to an arbitrator simply on account of 
his sex would be extremely difficult.315  Furthermore, as noted 
above, binding religious arbitration had been practiced 
successfully for twelve years by Batei Din before the outcry 
over Islamic arbitration, and no complaints about procedural 
defects had been made. 
B. Freedom of Religion and the Enforceability of Religious 
Arbitration in the United States and Canada 
This section considers a new argument against the 
enforceability of religious arbitration: that it infringes the 
free exercise rights of those who are bound by religious 
arbitration agreements or awards.  The following sections set 
out the problems, from a free exercise perspective, with 
applying religious substantive or procedural law to resolving 
disputes. 
1. United States 
i. The First Amendment Right to Freedom of 
Religion 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .  prohibiting 
the free exercise [of religion].”316  As stated above, the 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has evolved over 
the years, and there is no reason to believe that it will not 
continue to do so.317  However, one definite marker can be laid 
down: no person may be obliged to believe in any faith, or not 
to believe in any faith. This point was made most famously in 
the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments of James Madison: “The Religion then of every 
man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every 
 314. Newfoundland Tel. Co. v. Newfoundland, [1992] 1. S.C.R. 623, para. 23 
(Can.). 
 315. Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of sex.  Charter, supra note 2, §§ 15(1), 28. 
 316. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 317. DAVID O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 4 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
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man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these 
may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable 
right.”318  These words have been cited on numerous occasions 
by the Supreme Court.319 
There are, generally speaking, few rights that are truly 
“inalienable.” The right to have a nationality is a plausible 
contender.320  The right to vote is a right that may not be sold, 
but which the state can alienate.321  The Declaration of 
Independence names “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of 
Happiness” as inalienable rights—but courts have the power 
to infringe these rights.322  However, Madison was at pains to 
explain why the right to religion was inalienable.  It was 
inalienable both because “the opinions of men, depending only 
on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot 
follow the dictates of other men;” and because it is the “duty 
of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such 
 318. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 48, 50 (John J. Patrick & Gerald P. Long eds., 1999). 
 319. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 n.38 (1985) (striking down 
Alabama statute authorizing period of silence in public schools for meditation or 
prayer); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 705 & App. II (1970) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (upholding property tax exemption for religious properties); Everson 
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947) (prohibiting use of public funds to pay 
for transport of children to Catholic schools); id. at 37 & App. (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting). 
 320. In Perez v. Brownell, Chief Justice Warren wrote that “[c]itizenship is 
man’s basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have rights.”  356 U.S. 
44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).  Warren’s views did not carry the day, 
and it was ruled that the petitioner could be stripped of his U.S. citizenship.  Id. 
at 62.  However, he was not rendered stateless, since he also had Mexican 
citizenship.  Id. at 46.  The majority was therefore not troubled by the fact that 
he could be left without any nationality, and it was only Chief Justice Warren’s 
dissent that was concerned with the question of statelessness in general.  Id. at 
64. 
 321. As of March 2010, forty-nine states denied the right to vote to 
incarcerated felons; thirty-five states, to paroled felons; thirty states, to felons 
on probation; and two states, to all felons.  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fdlawsinusMar11.pdf.  
Felon disfranchisement laws have been upheld as constitutional, provided that 
they do not have a discriminatory motive and impact.  See Hunter v. 
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 322. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The Declaration of Independence . . . is not a legal prescription conferring 
powers upon the courts.”). 
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only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.”323  No American 
court has ever suggested that any person might be coerced 
into believing in a faith in which he or she does not wish to 
believe. 
The right to believe, or not to believe, in any religion has 
a necessary corollary: the right to change one’s beliefs.  It is 
this right that is endangered in court enforcement of religious 
arbitration orders. 
ii. The Right to Change Religious Beliefs and 
Enforceable Religious Arbitration 
American courts have consistently upheld the 
enforceability of religious arbitration agreements if the 
agreements were entered into voluntarily.324  On account of 
state and federal policies favoring arbitration, the burden on 
proving lack of voluntariness is on the part of the person 
seeking to exit the agreement.325  Courts do not look for such 
evidence themselves.  Therefore, a court would not seek proof 
that someone who had agreed to enter into Christian 
arbitration, was, in fact, a Christian.  In any case, such an 
inquiry—determining the status of a party’s religion—would 
likely contravene the religious question doctrine. 
Many religious arbitrations are predicated on the 
assumption that the parties are, however, of a certain faith.  
For example, a Beth Din will only sit in judgment between 
two Jewish parties.326  A ketubah stating that any divorce will 
be arbitrated by a rabbinical court necessarily presupposes 
that the parties are Jewish.327 
No court, however, has considered an obvious question: 
what if a party was happy to agree a religious arbitration 
contract, but then wishes to change religion before the 
contract is arbitrated? This is not an extreme hypothetical.  
Cases of parties attempting to overturn an arbitration ruling 
 323. Madison, supra note 318. 
 324. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (2005). 
 325. Id. at 1655–56. 
 326. See, e.g., RONALD L. EISENBERG, THE JPS GUIDE TO JEWISH TRADITIONS 
568 (2004) (describing how Batei Din in Israel exercise “complete jurisdiction 
over the Jewish population” in personal matters). 
 327. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in 
American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 579–83 (2004) (describing use of 
ketubot among Jewish communities). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 136 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 136 Side B      04/16/2012   17:10:32
4_WALTER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  4:16:34 PM 
550 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
because of religious differences with the arbitrators have 
come before the courts.  One such case, Encore Productions v. 
Promise Keepers, was noted earlier.328  The Encore court held 
that “[a]lthough it may not be proper for a district court to 
refer civil issues to a religious tribunal in the first instance, if 
the parties agree to do so, it is proper for a district court to 
enforce their contract.”329  The court took the view that the 
agreement to undergo religious arbitration was a question of 
civil contract law, so a court could enforce it. 
Encore is troublesome. There was no underlying religious 
issue that a court could not adjudicate—for example, an issue 
that would pose a “religious question.” The dispute was a 
purely commercial one relating to the termination of a 
contract.  Nevertheless, the court held, following established 
doctrine, that voluntary consent to take a dispute to 
arbitration was all that mattered.  In effect, the court held 
that a party could alienate its rights to religious freedom, by 
having a religious procedural law imposed on it through 
arbitration. 
Encore was wrongly decided.  Religious arbitration of 
non-religious issues should not be binding on parties through 
the civil courts, because it risks infringing their right to 
religious freedom.  The problematic nature of this kind of 
issue can be brought out by another example.  Suppose that 
an individual signing an employment contract with a 
Christian school agrees to Christian dispute resolution in the 
case of conflict.  This contract may contain a clause obliging 
her, before moving to binding arbitration, to attempt a 
conciliation session according to Biblical principles.330  In 
order to take part in the conciliation, the party will need to 
act in a “Christian” fashion.  Her religious rights have been 
alienated by the contract. 
Of course, it is possible for religion to form an element of 
a contract. The same teacher may, under the terms of her 
contract, agree that she will remain a member of a church, for 
example.331  However, in such a case the teacher has not 
 328. 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999). 
 329. Id. at 1112–13. 
 330. For a discussion of Biblical principles in conflict resolution, see KEN 
SANDE, THE PEACEMAKER: A BIBLICAL GUIDE TO RESOLVING PERSONAL 
CONFLICT (2004). 
 331. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 945 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 137 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 137 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
4_WALTER FINAL.DOC 3/15/2012  4:16:34 PM 
2012] RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION 551 
alienated her right to religious freedom.  She may always 
choose to cease teaching at the same time as stopping going to 
church.  Suppose, however, that she ceased to go to church 
and the school then began proceedings against her for breach 
of contract.  If the school then compelled her to go to religious 
arbitration, this would constitute a denial of religious 
freedom, and her right to religious freedom would have been 
alienated.332  If the school took action before a secular 
tribunal, however, there would be no alienation of the right to 
religious freedom.  The teacher had exercised her free right to 
change religion; it merely happened that her employment 
contract was conditional on her not doing so. 
The risk of alienation of religious rights is most clear in 
cases where one participant openly wishes to change religion.  
However, it can also be seen in cases where no party 
expresses a wish to change religion.  This is because religious 
arbitrations have a deterrent effect on people changing 
faith—and this deterrence works a form of alienation.  Take, 
for example, an employee who works at a Christian school, 
and who has a Christian arbitration clause in her 
employment contract.  When she signed the contract, she self-
identified as a Christian.  The employee may now have a 
grievance against the school and wish to have this grievance 
adjudicated.  At the same time, she no longer wishes to 
identify as Christian, and would like to take steps that 
symbolize that she is no longer a Christian—for example, 
ceasing to attend her church.  However, because she knows 
that she will have to take her dispute with the school to a 
Christian dispute resolution panel, she is reluctant to do so.  
contract under which “[t]eacher recognizes the religious nature of the Catholic 
School and agrees that Employer has the right to dismiss a teacher for serious 
public immorality, public scandal, or public rejection of the official teachings, 
doctrine or laws of the Roman Catholic Church.”); see also Prescott v. Northlake 
Christian Sch., 141 F. App’x 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2005) (describing school 
employment contract in which teacher promises to “attend and financially 
support a local church with fundamental beliefs that are in agreement with the 
doctrinal statement of [the school]”). 
 332. One potential response is that the teacher might preserve her right to 
religious freedom by simply acceding to the school’s demands in the religious 
arbitration, and thereby avoiding an appearance before the religious tribunal.  
However, this course of action would automatically lead to a financial penalty (a 
default judgment against her).  Leaving her job, on the other hand, would not 
lead to such a penalty, because she would have the option of finding other 
employment. 
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Her free exercise of religion has been constrained by the 
religious arbitration contract. 
This argument applies with the same force to the 
enforcement of religious arbitration awards as it does to the 
enforcement of arbitration proceedings.  Even if a party to a 
religious arbitration contract, after a dispute has arisen, 
consents to go to arbitration, there is an inevitable delay 
between this consent and the actual arbitration proceedings.  
It is during this period of delay that free exercise rights are 
again endangered.  Therefore, religious arbitral awards from 
proceedings that parties have consented to should be as 
unenforceable as the actual proceedings.333 
Some scholars have argued that religious arbitration 
increases religious freedom by providing a measure of “group 
autonomy”: persons of the same religion are able to group 
together to adjudicate their disputes according to the laws of 
their community.334  It is easy to appreciate the benefits of 
such procedures that give rise to cohesion within a 
community.  It is less clear, however, that such procedures 
should be binding when they govern purely secular disputes 
that would be justiciable in a civil court.  First, as noted 
above, these procedures have consequences for religious 
freedom, even if no party to the arbitration contract objects to 
the arbitration or the award.  Second, if one person attempts 
to avoid enforcement of the arbitration agreement or the 
award, and does not comply with them voluntarily, the 
community cohesion that the procedure is attempting to 
promote may already be lacking—and it is far from obvious 
that the state should step in to create it. 
On the other hand, agreements to arbitrate disputes that 
would not be justiciable in a civil court should be binding, as 
should be the awards therefrom.  This argument is made in 
the next subsection.   
 
 333. See infra Part IV.D concerning an immediate agreement to arbitrate. 
 334. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, When Religious Practices Become Legal 
Obligations: Extending the Foreign Compulsion Defense, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 
535 (2008); Helfand, supra note 104, at 1274 (“[M]any minority groups are 
becoming decreasingly concerned with their integration into civil society and 
increasingly concerned with securing their own law-like autonomy.”). 
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iii. Religious Arbitration on Religious Matters 
Religious arbitration on matters that involve “religious 
questions” should be binding in civil court.  As discussed 
above in Parts II.A.4 and II.B.2, these questions cannot be 
solved in a civil court.  If religious arbitration were not 
binding, these questions would have no possible judicial 
resolution. 
For example, a church might employ a priest on condition 
that he followed certain doctrine.  If a dispute arose as to 
whether he had followed the doctrine, no court would be able 
to resolve it, since it would be a quintessential religious 
question.  The only way in which it could be settled would be 
for a religious tribunal to adjudicate it. 
A court should then enforce the judgment of the tribunal, 
subject to the “public policy” and “disregard for the law” 
doctrines described above.  The alternative is clear: otherwise 
any such contract would be unenforceable, which would make 
it extremely difficult to run a church.  (Presumably, priests 
would need to be employed on an at-will basis, and would 
only be able to have very limited contractual rights—which 
could make them almost impossible to find.)  In this case, the 
restraint on religious freedom imposed by making the 
religious arbitration contract enforceable is outweighed by 
the gains to religious freedom by making it possible to run the 
church.  As one scholar has noted, “religious freedom . . . 
requires an infrastructure.”335  Religious arbitration on 
religious matters is a component of this infrastructure, in a 
way that religious arbitration on secular matters is not. 
Religious arbitration proceedings were found binding for 
much this reason in the case of Elmora Hebrew Center v. 
Fishman.336  In Fishman, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
enforced a religious award made by a Beth Din against a 
synagogue.  The court disregarded the argument made by the 
synagogue that it did not recognize the religious authority of 
the Beth Din, and that to enforce the award would violate its 
free exercise rights.337  The court warned that a trial court 
could not send civil issues to a religious authority for 
 335. Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional 
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274 (2008). 
 336. 593 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1991). 
 337. Id. at 731. 
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adjudication; but it endorsed sending religious issues to the 
same.338  This was a correct decision; otherwise, no resolution 
of the dispute would have been possible. 
2. Canada 
The arguments for making religious arbitration 
unenforceable in Canada are similar to those that justify 
making religious arbitration unenforceable in the United 
States. Canadians’ rights to the free exercise of religion are 
arguably even more sweeping than Americans’.  Furthermore, 
Canadians also have an absolute right to change religion.  
Therefore, religious arbitration on secular matters should be 
unenforceable. 
i. The Right of Free Exercise of Religion Under the 
Canadian Constitution 
The right of free exercise of religion is guaranteed by 
Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
enacted in 1982.339  This defines four “fundamental freedoms,” 
first among which is “freedom of conscience and religion.”340  
The Canadian Supreme Court considered the meaning of 
freedom of religion under the Charter for the first time in 
Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. in 1985.341  At issue was 
Alberta’s “Lord’s Day Act,” which prohibited trading on a 
Sunday.342  The court ruled that the Act infringed Canadians’ 
right to freedom of religion. The court defined freedom of 
religion as “the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a 
person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly 
and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to 
manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by 
teaching and dissemination.”343  This freedom, said the court, 
could “primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion 
or restraint.”344  The Canadian Supreme Court held that the 
 338. Id. at 732. 
 339. Charter, supra note 2, § 2 (providing that “[e]veryone has . . . freedom of 
conscience and belief.”). 
 340. Id. 
 341. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.).  Freedom of religion had previously been 
treated as part of the “federal legislative competence.”  Id. at para. 3. 
 342. Id. at para. 5. 
 343. Id. at para. 94. 
 344. Id. at para. 95. 
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Lord’s Day Act worked a “form of coercion” by “bind[ing] all to 
a sectarian Christian ideal.345 
The Big M Drug Mart decision was particularly striking 
since it adopted a broader conception of religious freedom 
than that found in American jurisprudence.  The Canadian 
Supreme Court specifically noted that the U.S. Supreme 
Court had, four times, upheld Sunday closing laws on the 
grounds that they now had a secular purpose and effect.346  
The Canadian court observed that its U.S. counterpart had 
found that although the Sunday closing laws had a “clear 
origin in the religiously coercive statutes of Stuart England,” 
they had since evolved to become “purely secular labour 
legislation.”347  The Big M Drug Mart court, however, refused 
to find that Alberta’s Sunday closing law had a “secular 
purpose,” and denied an attempt by the appellants to argue 
that even if there was a religious purpose to the litigation, it 
had a secular effect.348 
ii. The Right to Change Religion Under the 
Canadian Constitution 
As noted above, the right freely to exercise religion 
necessarily implies the right to change religion.  This right 
has been explicitly noticed in Canadian law.  In Syndicat 
Northcrest v. Amselem, the Canadian Supreme Court  
was asked to rule whether an Orthodox Jew had the right  
to build a sukkah on the balcony of his apartment in 
Québec.349  A clause in Amselem’s condominium contract 
 345. Id. at para. 97. 
 346. Id. at para. 89.  The Canadian Supreme Court cited McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); 
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); 
and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). 
 347. Big M Drug Mart, 1 S.C.R. 295 at para. 74. 
 348. Id.  The Big M Drug Mart ruling was also notable for its discussion of 
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.  The Canadian Supreme Court 
observed that the U.S. Supreme Court had noted that Sunday closing laws in 
America were a “potential violation of the ‘anti-establishment’ principle.”  Id. at 
para. 106.  Yet the Canadian court rejected the appellants’ contention that the 
absence of an Establishment Clause in the Canadian Charter should be 
considered evidence in favor of the constitutionality of the Sunday closing laws.  
Id. at para. 108.  The unconstitutionality of the Lord’s Day Act, rather, 
depended on Section Two of the Charter alone.  Id. 
 349. [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.). 
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banned exterior “constructions of any kind whatsoever.”350  
The court noted the argument, accepted by the trial court, 
that the ban on constructions on balconies was “neutral”: it 
affected all constructions on balconies equally.351  Other items 
that the housing association had requested removed from 
balconies included emphatically secular satellite dishes and 
trellis.352  However, it held that the neutrality of the rule at 
issue did not matter in a case where rights to freedom of 
religion were “significantly impaired.”353  What mattered to 
the court was that the appellants (of whom Amselem was the 
named party) had a sincere religious belief that they should 
build sukkot.354  Once the court had established the sincerity 
of this belief, it was wrong to go further and attempt to decide 
whether this sincere belief was theologically correct, which 
the trial court had done.355  Instead the court cited both 
Canadian and American decisions that stand for the 
proposition that courts should be deferential to personal 
views of religious obligation.356 
In order to determine “sincerity” of belief, the trial judge 
had taken account of whether the appellants had built sukkot 
in the past.357  As a result of this, he determined that some of 
them had a “sincere” belief, but others did not.  The Canadian 
Supreme Court rejected this approach. It held that a court 
could not “conclude that a person’s current religious belief is 
not sincere simply because he or she previously celebrated a 
religious holiday differently.”358  It expressly noted: “Beliefs 
and observances evolve and change over time.”359  The court 
 350. Id. at para. 9. 
 351. Id. at para. 29. 
 352. Id. at para. 111 (Bastarache J, dissenting). 
 353. Id. at para. 64. 
 354. Id. at para. 46 (“[O]ur Court’s past decisions and the basic principles 
underlying freedom of religion support the view that freedom of religion consists 
of the freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with 
religion, in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is 
sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his 
or her spiritual faith . . . .”). 
 355. Id. at para. 66. 
 356. Id. at paras. 43–46 (citing Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 
(1989); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); R. v. 
Videoflicks, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (Can.); R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (Can.)). 
 357. Id. at para. 71. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
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made clear that it would not place a party under a disability 
because of a change of beliefs; all that was necessary was that 
the change should be sincere. 
iii. Religious Arbitration of Secular Issues Under the 
Canadian Constitution 
The above discussion shows that all the same protections 
for freedom of religion—and the right to change religion—
exist under Canadian law as under American law.  A fortiori, 
the same basic arguments apply as to why religious 
arbitration of non-religious issues should be unenforceable 
under Canadian law. 
However, the Canadian constitutional right to freedom of 
religion is even stronger than its American counterpart.  
Notably, the Canadian Supreme Court in Amselem rejected 
two arguments, discussed in more detail below, why religious 
arbitration might be held enforceable in the United States.  
First, the court specifically rejected the argument that the 
housing association’s rule against exterior construction was 
simply a “neutral” regulation that affected all apartment 
owners equally.360  In the United States, under Employment 
Division v. Smith, such a regulation might well be held 
constitutional on the grounds that it was a “neutral law of 
general applicability.”361 
Second, the court also rejected the argument that 
contracts are inherently secular matters that cannot be 
overturned for religious reasons, as American courts have 
held.362  The dissent in Amselem argued that the case should 
be decided on grounds of contract rights.  Justice Binnie 
stressed the weight he placed on “the private contract 
voluntarily made among the parties to govern their mutual 
rights and obligations.”363  The appellants, he noted, 
“undertook by contract to the owners of this building to abide 
by the rules of this building,” and therefore should not be 
permitted to build their sukkah.364  The Canadian Supreme 
Court, in rejecting this reasoning, held that freedom of 
 360. Id. at para. 29. 
 361. 494 U.S. 872, 879 n.3 (1990).  See infra note 396 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 363. Amselem, 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 184 (Binnie J, dissenting). 
 364. Id. at para. 185. 
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religion trumps freedom of contract.  In doing so, they 
implicitly rejected the reasoning of American courts that have 
forced parties to accept religious arbitration against their 
will. 
iv. Religious Arbitration of Religious Issues 
As in America, however, religious arbitration should be 
enforceable when it concerns religious issues that cannot be 
resolved by a civil court.  When a party can only resolve a 
dispute by appearing before a religious tribunal, and refuses 
to do so despite his prior agreement, a civil court should be 
able to penalize him for this.  This is illustrated well by the 
precedent of Marcovitz v. Bruker,365 the Canadian Supreme 
Court case discussed above.366 
In Marcovitz, the court signaled its desire to help Jewish 
women obtain religious divorces by punishing a husband for 
the breach of his contractual duty to grant a religious divorce 
from a Beth Din.367  The court specifically noted that Canada’s 
Divorce Act had been amended simply to make it possible to 
oblige men to grant gittin from Batei Din.368  It compared the 
Canadian law with that of other jurisdictions, and noted that 
New York had amended its divorce law so that the party 
instigating the divorce had to certify that there were no 
barriers to the remarriage of either party, and so that judges 
could take account of any barriers when dividing up assets.369  
The court also noted how Jewish women—unlike Jewish men, 
and unlike Christian women, Muslim women or women of 
other faiths—alone suffered from a peculiar disability in 
depending on their husbands to obtain a religiously valid 
divorce.370 
Marcovitz was decided correctly. By granting damages, 
the Canadian Supreme Court signaled its willingness to 
enforce a contractual agreement to appear before a Beth 
Din.371  The religious nature of the get is such that only a Beth 
Din can grant it; a civil body is entirely powerless in this 
 365. Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.). 
 366. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 367. Marcovitz, 3 S.C.R. 607 at paras. 93–95. 
 368. Id. at paras. 7–8. 
 369. Id. at paras. 134–53. 
 370. Id. at para. 7. 
 371. Id. at paras. 94–100. 
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area. The court observed the case involved a clash of rights: 
“the claim to religious protection is balanced against 
competing interests.”372  On the one hand was husband’s right 
to exercise his religion as he saw fit; on the other hand was 
the wife’s right to be free to remarry according to the laws of 
her religion.  The Québec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms in fact mandates a balancing between fundamental 
rights, such as the free exercise of religion, and a regard for 
“democratic values.”373  The court found for the wife, 
although, as previously noted, it was not faced with the 
question of whether it should force the husband to appear at 
the Beth Din. 
The principle of Marcovitz can be extended to any 
instance where a dispute can only be settled by religious 
authorities: in such cases, it is freedom-enhancing, not 
freedom-limiting, to enforce religious arbitral awards and 
agreements.374  The next Part considers responses to the 
argument put forward in this Part. 
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RELIGIOUS 
ARBITRATION 
The argument above is novel, and open to counter-
arguments.  Four potential responses will be dealt with in 
this Part. 
A. Freedom of Contract 
One response to the argument in Part III is that, under 
the doctrine of freedom of contract, parties should have the 
right to enter into any contract they choose—including one 
that contains a religious arbitration clause.375  In such a 
contract, it is easy to discern the tension between freedom of 
contract and freedom of religion.  Under principles of freedom 
of contract, the contract should be enforceable.  Under 
principles of freedom of religion, it should not, since it 
restricts one’s choice of religion later. 
 
 372. Id. at para. 20. 
 373. Id. at para. 15.  The court considered the Québec Charter in greater 
depth than the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 374. See Garnett, supra note 335. 
 375. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 104, at 1241. 
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This distinction can be termed one of ex ante and ex post 
liberty.  Ex ante liberty is a liberty where a subject is “free to 
be forced”: she can enter into contracts that in some way 
constrain her rights later.376  Ex post liberty is a 
“Rousseauian” liberty: the subject is “forced to be free,” and 
cannot enter into contracts that later constrain her rights.377  
Ex ante and ex post liberty are necessarily in tension with 
each other. Economists defend ex ante liberty, even in areas 
that are removed from traditional areas of economic focus, 
such as marriage.378 
To prevent parties from entering into religious 
arbitration contracts is a restriction of ex ante liberty.  
However, courts have frequently upheld restrictions on ex 
ante liberty.  In the United States, for example, employees 
can only waive their right to sue under the Age 
Discrimination Employment Act in limited circumstances.379  
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal 
proceedings can only be waived in a “knowing and voluntary” 
manner.380  Courts strike down contracts that harm a person’s 
ability to make a living or practice a trade.381  Canadian 
courts in Canada also restrict ex ante liberty in various 
circumstances.382 
Courts scrutinize contracts that involve waivers of rights 
for evidence of substantive or procedural unconscionability.383  
 376.  F. H. Buckley, Introduction to The FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT 1, 17 (F.H. Buckley  ed., 1999). 
 377. Id. 
 378. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational 
Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998) (defending Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage 
Act, under which parties who agree to have a “covenant marriage” must wait for 
two years if they wish to obtain a no-fault divorce).  John Witte and Joel Nichols 
have explored the use of binding religious law in marriage contracts.  See John 
Witte Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Faith-Based Family Law in Western Democracies?, 
in FIDES ET LIBERTAS 122 (2010), available at http://www.irla.org 
/assets/files/Fides/Fides2010.pdf. 
 379. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426 (1998). 
 380. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086 (2009). 
 381. See, e.g., Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 240 N.W. 2d 710 
(Mich. 1976). 
 382. See, e.g., R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, para. 26 (Can.) (holding 
that waiver of right to counsel in trial “must be premised on a true appreciation 
of the consequences of giving up the right”); Bryant v. R., [1984] 6 O.A.C. 118 
(Can. Ont. C.A.) (holding that waiver of jury trial is valid only if it is made with 
a full understanding of what is involved). 
 383. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in 
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However, some rights cannot be waived at all; or they can be 
waived very easily.  The right to vote is one such right: some 
economists have suggested that the right should be sellable, 
although this is of course illegal.384  There is, at the same 
time, no right to sell oneself into slavery—as various 
philosophers have noted.385  The right to freedom of speech, on 
the other hand, can be waived very easily: it is regularly 
waived by millions of Americans each day who, while at work, 
agree not to engage in activities that are unrelated to their 
employment.386 
The right to freedom of religion falls in the former 
category.  Two arguments can be made in support of this 
contention.  The first has historical roots: in the eighteenth 
century, as noted above, Jefferson argued that the right of 
religious freedom was “inalienable.”  This was not a uniquely 
American sentiment: in the United Kingdom at the same 
time, Richard Price wrote that “no people can lawfully 
surrender their religious liberty by giving up their right of 
judging for themselves in religion, or by allowing any human 
beings to prescribe to them what faith they shall embrace.”387 
The second argument is more modern, and is founded in 
discrimination doctrine.  Religion, like race and sex, has come 
to be considered as a protected category in Western 
jurisprudence.388  This is because it has long been a source of 
discrimination in society; 389 protections against religious 
the Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255 (1988). 
 384. See Ryan Hagen, Is it Smarter to Sell Your Vote or to Cast it?,  
FREAKONOMICS (Nov. 16, 2007), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2007/11/16/is-it-smarter-to-sell-your-vote-or-to-cast-it/. 
 385. See, e.g., Andrew Sneddon,  What’s Wrong with Selling Yourself into 
Slavery? Paternalism and Deep Autonomy, 33 CRÍTICA: REVISTA 
HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFÍA 97 (2001). 
 386. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 
(Mass. 1892) (“There are few employments for hire in which the servant does 
not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as of 
idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as 
he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.” (Holmes, J.)). 
 387. RICHARD PRICE AND THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: SELECTIONS FROM HIS PAMPHLETS 78–79 (Bernard Peach ed., 
1979). 
 388. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) 
(prohibiting employment discrimination on grounds of “race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin”). 
 389. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under the Constitution: 
Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 491–92 (1994) (“Perhaps 
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discrimination, just like sexual and racial discrimination, are 
built into modern constitutions and codes.  It is very hard for 
a person to enter into a contract that discriminates against 
another party on grounds of race or sex: except in certain 
circumstances, such a contract would be unenforceable.390 
By the same token, it should not be possible for a person 
to enter into a contract that could lead to discrimination 
against another party on grounds of religion.  Binding 
religious arbitration contracts have this potentially 
discriminatory effect.  A person who is bound by the 
procedural law of a certain religion against his will may not 
be able to participate fully in the arbitral proceedings and 
may thus suffer discrimination.  Therefore—unless there is 
no other way in which the dispute may be settled, as in 
“religious question” cases—these proceedings should not be 
enforceable at law.391 
 
the strongest justification for strict judicial scrutiny of any official attempt to 
accord  persons less than equal  respect and dignity either because  of their  
religious  beliefs  or race  rests  in the fact  that throughout  history  such efforts  
have  been  similarly rooted in hate, prejudice,  vengeance, and hostility.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 390. To enter into a contract that apparently discriminates on grounds of a 
protected category such as race or sex, an employer must be able to show that 
the characteristic sought is a “bona fide occupational quality.”  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). Courts do not permit such discrimination easily.  See, e.g., 
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (“The BFOQ 
defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly.”).  In the 
seminal case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court held that a 
racially discriminatory contract could not be enforced against the target of the 
discrimination; this holding was extended in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 
(1953), to prevent enforcement of a racially discriminatory agreement to the 
detriment of a party who was not the target of the discrimination. 
 391. Probate cases are an interesting example of when courts have upheld 
legal provisions that apparently infringe on individuals’ religious freedom.  In 
Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234 (Mass. 1955), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court upheld a provision of a will that stripped the inheritance rights 
of a beneficiary who married outside the Jewish faith.  However, cases such as 
these are distinguishable from the arbitration cases discussed in this Article.  In 
the case of testamentary restrictions, the right of the beneficiary to receive a 
gift is subject to that person behaving in a certain (religious) way.  In the 
examples of religious arbitration that this Article considers problematic, the 
litigants are not attempting to obtain a gift, but to vindicate their contractual 
rights.  See supra note 331 and accompanying text (discussing religious 
enforcement of secular employment contracts). 
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B. Freedom of Religion 
Another response to the argument that enforceable 
religious arbitration clauses infringe freedom of religion is 
that such clauses are in fact a manifestation of freedom of 
religion.392  Under this argument, the right to enter into such 
agreements is a form of religious freedom, which  
courts should uphold.  However, this argument reflects a 
misconception of religious arbitration and of religious 
freedom. 
First, under the argument above, parties who wish to 
enter into religious arbitration on secular matters are still 
entirely free to do so.  While it would likely constitute an 
infringement of religious freedom to shut down a center or 
institution that operated such services, it does not constitute 
an infringement of religious freedom to refuse to honor an 
agreement or award in court.  The parties to such a religious 
arbitration contract are still perfectly free to abide by the 
terms of the contract themselves.  If the parties do not wish 
voluntarily to abide by the terms, this may in fact be a sign 
that the benefits to religious freedom from promoting this 
agreement are relatively limited.393 
Second, religious freedom is not construed as the ability 
to have secular courts recognize religious arbitration 
agreements or awards on secular matters.  For example, the 
Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom ranks 
countries by their religious freedom, on a scale of 1 to 7.394  
The rankings are based on the results of checklists sent to 
experts in each country. While the checklists contained a host 
of different variables, from the predictable (for example, “Do 
citizens have the right to change religion or belief?” to the 
complex (for example, “Do communities of believers, different 
groups within religions, atheistic groups, and institutions 
enjoy the same rights in access to various public methods of 
social communication?”), not one of them implicates the right 
to have religious agreements or rulings honored in secular 
 392. See, e.g., Zohra Moosa, Balancing Women’s Rights with Freedom of 
Religion: The Case Against Parallel Legal Systems for Muslim Women in the 
UK, in STATE OF THE WORLD’S MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 2010, at 
42 (2010). 
 393. See supra note 335. 
 394. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (Paul A. Marshall ed., 2008). 
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courts.395  Similarly, a report sponsored by the Pew 
Charitable Trust lists various factors that are implicated in 
religious freedom, “including the right not to have personal 
religious beliefs eroded by the requirements of religious law 
or custom”—but it contains no reference to whether religious 
judgments should be enforceable in secular courts.396  While 
there are, as noted above, “infrastructural” benefits to 
binding religious arbitration on religious matters, as noted 
above, these benefits are not secured by enforcing religious 
tribunals’ judgments on purely secular disputes. 
C. Discrimination Against Religion 
A related response to that in Part IV.B above is that 
refusal to honor religious judgments in secular court 
constitutes discrimination against religion.  This is, on its 
face, a plausible argument.  If two parties can contract to 
arbitrate their dispute according to the laws of another 
jurisdiction, it might seem that there is no reason why they 
should not be able to contract to use the laws of a religion. 
American and Canadian courts have both considered 
laws that ostensibly discriminate not against one particular 
religion, but against all religions.  In the United States, the 
Court has noted that “the right of free exercise does not 
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid 
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground  
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his  
religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ” 397  The case, Employment 
Division v. Smith, involved two individuals who had ingested 
peyote, a psychoactive drug, as part of a religious ceremony, 
 395. Id. at 451–76.  The only mention of the court system is a question “Do 
believers of different religions, different groups within religions, and atheists 
enjoy the same rights . . . before the courts?”  Id. at 464. 
 396. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 8 (Kevin Boyle & 
Juliet Sheen eds., 1997); see also Audrey Macklin, Performing Citizenship: 
Encultured Women’s Articulation of Claims in the Public Sphere, in 
MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS AND GENDER 285 (Seyla 
Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009) (noting that the Ontario legislation 
making religious arbitration unenforceable in civil courts was “probably secure 
from the complaint that it discriminates against religious law,” since it “denie[d] 
recognition to all legal orders external to Canadian law.”). 
 397. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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and were fired.398  The possession of peyote was a crime in 
Oregon, and the intent to use the drug for religious purposes 
was not accepted as an affirmative defense by the Oregon 
courts.399  The Court noted that the law banning peyote 
possession was a typical anti-narcotic statute that had an 
apparently secular purpose, and compared it with laws 
obliging shops to close on Sunday, statutes banning 
polygamy, and a regulation compelling the Amish to pay 
social security taxes contrary to their religious belief.400 
 It seems clear, following Smith, that a prohibition 
against judicial recognition of arbitral agreements or awards 
would not violate the U.S. Constitution, since it would be a 
neutral law that would affect all religions equally.  However, 
this argument has an inevitable rejoinder.  If it is “neutral” 
(and hence constitutional) to prohibit judicial recognition of 
religious arbitral agreements and awards, it is surely equally 
“neutral” to permit judicial recognition of such agreements 
and awards.  Furthermore, the Smith Court rejected any 
heightened level of judicial scrutiny for rules that  
may infringe freedom of religion.401  Therefore, even though 
religious arbitration may restrict freedom of religion, the 
state should still have the right to enforce religious arbitral 
agreements and awards.402 
This argument is probably the strongest that can be 
made in defense of religious arbitration, but is still 
rebuttable.  There is a fundamental difference between the 
right to have a court enforce a religious arbitration agreement 
or award, and the regulations cited as “neutral” in Smith.  All 
of the regulations cited as “neutral” in Smith affect how an 
individual may practice his or her religion.  For example, the 
injunction against polygamy prevents a person for whom 
polygamy is a religious tenet from practicing this aspect of his 
religion.403  However, it does not deter an individual from 
exercising her right to change religion: it does not force a 
 398. Id. at 874. 
 399. Id. at 875. 
 400. Id. at 879–80 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U.S. 599 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)). 
 401. Id. at 885–89. 
 402. See id. at 890 (stating that it is the responsibility of the legislature to 
determine what laws may infringe freedom of religion). 
 403. See, e.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161–65. 
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person to appear before a religious tribunal and participate in 
religiously based arbitral proceedings. 
Furthermore, the Smith Court also reaffirmed the core 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, as described above. 
Justice Scalia wrote “[t]he free exercise of religion means, 
first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever 
religious doctrine one desires . . . . The government may not 
compel affirmation of religious belief . . . .”404  As this Article 
has argued, forcing a party to go to religious arbitration when 
it is unnecessary to do so runs directly counter to “the right  
. . . to profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”  
Therefore, a defense of the enforceability of religious 
arbitration based on Smith cannot be successful. 
Canadian courts do not have a doctrine of neutrality such 
as that followed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith.  
However, there is a firm policy that public institutions are 
permitted to bar their doors to religion, so long as they do so 
in an even-handed fashion.  In Bal v. Ontario, parents sought 
permission to establish alternative “opt-in” religious schools 
within Ontario’s secular school system.405  Such religious 
schools had been permitted while Ontario had a Christian 
public school system, but following the secularization of the 
system (which itself was the result of court cases), “opt-in” 
schools had been banned.406  The court held that the law 
prohibiting such schools did not violate freedom of religion:407 
The public school system is secular, it does not present the 
opportunity for education in any particular denomination 
or faith. The objective is to provide non-denominational 
education.  Should parents desire that their children have 
a religious education they must assume the cost.  This 
does not mean that there is adverse effect discrimination.  
The government prohibition is just, fair and 
constitutional. 
Canadian courts have in fact been criticized for 
“jump[ing] to the conclusion that the Charter mandates a 
secular society in which public institutions must be free from 
 404. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
 405. [1994] 21 O.R. 3d 681 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.), aff’d, Bal v. Ontario, [1997] 
101 O.A.C. 219 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 406. Id. at para. 10. 
 407. Id. at para. 118. 
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any religious taint.”408  Other commentators have noted that 
the courts simply seek to “ensure that all individuals are . . . 
treated by the state with equal respect, whatever their 
religious beliefs and practices.”409  Regardless of how the 
position of the courts is characterized, it seems clear that 
“neutral” laws affecting the exercise of religion do not infringe 
constitutional rights in Canada. 
Therefore, it would not be unconstitutional to bar courts 
from recognizing religious arbitral awards and agreements.  
However, as in the case of the discussion of American law, the 
reverse question is appropriate: is it constitutional to permit 
religious arbitral awards to be enforced simply because all 
religion is treated in an equal manner?  The answer is “no.”  
Unlike its American counterpart, the Canadian Supreme 
Court has not held that laws of neutral application affecting 
religious belief are constitutional, per Employment Division  
v. Smith.410  Therefore, it is not possible to advance a 
“neutrality” argument simply to justify the judicial 
recognition of religious arbitral awards and agreements.411 
D. An Immediate Agreement to Arbitrate 
If it is accepted that a religious arbitration agreement 
cannot be enforced because it infringes an individual’s right 
 408. David M. Brown, Freedom from or Freedom for?: Religion as a Case 
Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 
551 (2000). 
 409. Richard Moon, Liberty, Neutrality and Inclusion: Religious Freedom 
Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 563, 
564 (2003). 
 410. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Employment Division v. Smith has never been cited 
with approval by the Canadian Supreme Court.  It was referred to by the 
dissent in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, para. 189 (Can.) 
(Binnie J, dissenting). 
 411. Rather, the Canadian Supreme Court, when examining facially neutral 
laws to determine whether they infringe freedom of religion, investigates 
whether they adversely affect a particular subgroup.  In Multani v. Marguerite-
Bourgeoys, for example, the Canadian Supreme Court was asked to consider the 
constitutionality of a school rule that prevented a Sikh boy from carrying a 
ceremonial dagger, or kirpan, to school.  [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).  The 
majority noted that there is a “duty to make reasonable accommodation for 
individuals who are adversely affected by a policy or rule that is neutral on its 
face.”  Id. at para. 53.  In the case of arbitration, individuals who cannot enforce 
religious arbitral awards or agreements in a secular court are not “adversely 
affected” by the inability to do so—since they have the option of litigating the 
matter, if necessary, in a civil court. 
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to change religion, a final objection is possible.  Why should 
courts refuse to honor an arbitral award when the arbitration 
is carried immediately?  Two parties could agree to take a 
dispute to religious arbitration, and have it settled on the 
spot, before either party had the time to consider changing 
religion.  In such cases, there would seem to be little risk of 
infringement of free exercise rights.412 
However, there is a difficulty with a secular court’s 
enforcement of a religious arbitration award in such a 
situation: it is impossible for a court to determine whether a 
religious arbitration has taken place quickly enough to justify 
the enforcement of the award.  An immediate resolution by a 
religious tribunal would seem acceptable.  However, the 
question is more complex if the mediation started 
immediately, and lasted several days, or even weeks.  There 
would in that case be a period of time in which someone 
might reconsider his or her beliefs, and wish to exit the 
process.  Similarly, the situation would be more complicated if 
the dispute resolution process started two days after the 
parties agreed to submit their dispute to a religious arbiter.  
A court would need to decide on a bright-line that would be 
completely arbitrary—and unworkable.  It would be 
impossible for a court to hold that if a dispute was resolved 
within x days of agreeing to submit to religious arbitration, 
the award could be enforced in secular court, but not if it was 
resolved within x + 1 days.  Therefore, the only solution for 
the courts is to refuse to enforce religious arbitration awards 
on secular matters, regardless of when the arbitral agreement 
was signed.413  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that religious arbitration on 
secular matters should be non-binding in both the United 
States and Canada.  Americans’ free exercise rights are 
 412. See supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
 413. Courts do, of course, set down apparently arbitrary temporal lines to use 
as judicial rules.  In the United States, the most famous example may be the 
trimester framework for abortion laid down in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–
65 (1973).  Such lines are, of course, easily open to attack.  See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) 
(overturning the trimester framework of Roe, and noting that “[a]ny judicial act 
of line-drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary”). 
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jeopardized by the current practice in the United States.  In 
Ontario, the government took the right decision to make 
religious arbitration non-binding in matters of family law in 
2006.  However, other forms of religious arbitration on non-
religious matters remain binding, and these should also 
become non-binding, both in Ontario and the rest of Canada. 
Legislators should be sure to stress that religious 
arbitration remains a favored mode of dispute resolution.  An 
act making religious arbitral agreements or awards 
unenforceable would face far less resistance if it was at the 
same time recognized that such tribunals can play a valuable 
role in society.  Parties should still feel free to settle their 
disputes out of the court system, just as now.  An act that 
renders religious arbitration awards and agreements 
unenforceable should not be interpreted as an attack on 
religious arbitration per se.  With care, legislators will be 
arrive at a result that preserves the constitutional right to 
freedom of religion but is not perceived as being an attack on 
a religious communities. 
A further implication of the argument in this Article is 
that religious arbitration on secular matters may be 
constitutionally suspect in many jurisdictions outside North 
America.  Even though the United States and Canada have 
different jurisprudence on the free exercise of religion, 
enforceable religious arbitration can be seen to be problematic 
in both countries.  It therefore does not seem unreasonable to 
surmise that the arguments in this Article may also be 
extended to other countries: this is an interesting hypothesis, 
and one that is worthy of research, given that other Western 
nations, such as the United Kingdom, have also had vocal 
debates about the status of religious arbitration within their 
borders.414  This Article thus provides grounds for challenging 
the status of religious arbitration in North America, and 
furthers the discussion over the status of religious arbitration 
elsewhere in the world. 
 
 414. For the debate that has taken place in the United Kingdom, see,  
for example, Riazat Butt, Archbishop Backs Sharia Law for British Muslims,  
GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
uk/2008/feb/07/religion.world; Afua Hirsch, Dozens of Sharia Courts Are Giving 
Illegal Advice, Claims Civitas Report, GUARDIAN (London), June 29, 2009,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jun/29/sharia-courts-illegal-advice-claims. 
